# Octas---UK 21

## 1NC

### Off

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#### Interpretation---the resolution should define the division of Aff and Neg ground---it was negotiated and announced in advance, providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare---only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research.

#### The USFG means the three branches.

OECD 87. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### Resolved means to enact a policy by law.

Words & Phrases 64. Permanent Edition.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The core antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act.

Thomas Horton 10. Professor of Law and Heidepriem Trial Advocacy Fellow, University of South Dakota School of Law. “Rediscovering Antitrust's Lost Values.” The University of New Hampshire Law Review. https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1305&context=unh\_lr

Part II of this Article discusses Congress’s historical balancing and blending of fundamental political, social, moral, and economic values to create a constitutional-like set of flexible laws that can be adapted to unforeseen and changing economic and political circumstances.22 Part II.A. briefly reviews some of the extensive scholarship addressing Congress’s balancing of values and objectives in its core antitrust laws including the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. Parts II.B. and C. explore the less-studied balancing of political, social, moral, and economic values and objectives in more recent antitrust legislation.23 Part II.B. specifically examines the legislative debates undergirding the passage of the HSR Act. 24 Part II.C. then turns to the debates and discourse that led to the passage of the NCRA in 1984 and the subsequent National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004. 25

#### Violation---they don’t defend USFG action that expands the scope of its core antitrust laws.

#### Vote Neg:

#### 1. Fairness---the Neg should win on average 50% of the time---any unfair advantage is a reason they should lose---their arguments are shaped by the drive to win, so presume their arguments are in bad faith.

#### 2. Clash---debate requires stasis to motivate research that develops third- and fourth-line responses---that’s key to effective politics and activism regardless of your personal beliefs---their interpretation explodes limits, makes the Aff conditional, and forces the Neg into concessionary ground.

### Off

DA

#### Big Tech is key to healthcare and precision medicine---the Aff trades off.

Business Insider, 21. “BIG TECH IN HEALTHCARE: Here's who wins and loses as Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft target niche sectors of healthcare.” Business Insider, Insider Intelligence, February 14, 2021. https://www.businessinsider.com/2-14-2021-big-tech-in-healthcare-report

Future of tech in healthcare

Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft have been dipping their toes into the healthcare industry, and some of their endeavors have the potential to change healthcare at large. As the Big Four move steadily onward into healthcare, it's necessary for legacy players (hospitals, insurers, pharma companies, health IT firms) to know exactly what their strategies look like, and what they stand to lose and gain. Here are some key takeaways from the report: Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft are gunning to carve out spaces within the healthcare market, and each is targetting its own set of sectors to transform or disrupt. Microsoft is focused on its race with Amazon and Google to lay claim to the healthcare cloud market, Apple is knuckling down on clinical research initiatives via its wearables, Alphabet is focusing on its AI expertise to **drive precision medicine**, and Amazon is shaping up to disrupt the pharmacy, virtual care, and telehealth realms. Their moves into healthcare are providing health systems with tech needed to patch up interoperability and data sharing gaps, giving healthcare payers a chance to collect a more comprehensive set of health data for members, and granting pharma companies the ability to streamline drug development and manufacturing.

#### Precision medicine is key to solve disease.

Ekaterina Pesheva, 21. Director of Science Communications & Media Relations at Harvard Medical School. “Toward Better Medicine.” August 18, 2021. https://hms.harvard.edu/news/toward-better-medicine

New insights into human biology, genetics, genomics, big-data science, clinical medicine, and computation have given Osler’s words a new meaning and brought precision medicine ever closer to reality. For example, scientific advances in the past 20 years have transformed the treatment of several types of cancers and led to the design of targeted therapies based on individualized genomic profiles for lung cancer, breast cancer, and melanoma. These successes in cancer therapy offer a potent illustration of the promise of precision medicine, but other conditions are also ripe for similar study and targeted approaches—metabolic disorders such as type 2 diabetes, various forms of cardiovascular disease, and immune diseases, including autoimmune conditions such as rheumatoid arthritis and type 1 diabetes. The promise of precision medicine goes beyond the ability to forecast how a patient would respond to a given treatment based on their genomic profile and choosing the best targeted medication for that patient. Done right, precision medicine could enable tailored predictions of disease well into the future, long before it manifests clinically. “The many synergies of this collaboration will allow us to realize the vision of precision medicine and move towards a future of predictive medicine, where the power to anticipate medical risk can prevent people from getting sick in the first place,” said Ben Reis, affiliate faculty member in the Department of Biomedical Informatics at Harvard Medical School and director of the Predictive Medicine Group at the Boston Children’s Hospital Computational Health Informatics Program. “The Berkowitzs’ generous gift creates profound opportunities both for Harvard and our partners at Clalit. We look forward to realizing the enormous potential of this transformational opportunity for the benefit of patients worldwide.” Lab to clinic and beyond Researchers at Clalit’s Precision Medicine Research Clinic will work side by side with scientists at the Living Laboratory in the Department of Biomedical Informatics at Harvard Medical School. Real-life data from millions of patients accumulated over decades, when analyzed in aggregate, can provide invaluable insights about the real-time behavior of a disease, but it could yield deeper answers as well. “Such insights can beget further ones by compelling researchers to ask questions about the origins of disease—the fundamental mechanisms that give rise to dysfunction,” said Shay Ben-Shachar, director of precision medicine and genomics at Clalit Research Institute. “This is the true long-term value of this effort.” The teams’ initial focus will be on two distinct groups of patients—those who respond exceptionally well to treatment and those who respond remarkably poorly. Exceptional responders are individuals who respond to therapies in unexpected and dramatically positive ways. This category also includes people at very high risk for disease but with surprisingly good outcomes. In an effort to understand why these people have such outstanding results, researchers will focus on untangling the array of factors that drive this unusual response. Initial areas of clinical focus include chronic conditions such as cardiovascular illness, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and diabetes, as well as emerging infectious diseases such as COVID-19. For example, scientists might probe the biologic and lifestyle factors that may allow some elderly, lifelong smokers to remain relatively healthy without developing lung cancer or other forms of lung disease. Insights could inform novel therapies and preventive approaches for others. At the other end of the spectrum, exceptional nonresponders are patients in whom standard therapies fail. Researchers will gather and analyze data from patients with autoimmune diseases such as inflammatory bowel disease and rheumatoid arthritis, for example, for whom standard treatments do not work. Understanding which underlying factors may prevent or interfere with response to treatment could inform ways to overcome these hurdles and design new treatments or tweak and optimize existing ones. Another subgroup of patients will be those with complex and mystifying conditions, for whom no clear diagnosis or treatment plan exists. Using a systems approach, clinicians and researchers at Clalit will work with scientists and medical investigators at HMS to unravel these medical mysteries by using computational methods to analyze patients’ genomic, protein, microbiome, and metabolic profiles in an effort to illuminate complex interactions between and across these variables that may lead to disease development or resistance to treatment. The COVID-19 pandemic has led to an accumulation of clinical data that may reveal interesting patterns about who gets infected and who goes on to develop minimal or severe disease, or why certain people experience long-haul COVID-19 symptoms that can linger for months. Using patient samples from survivors and analyzing their genomic, immune, metabolomic, and microbiome profiles, the researchers will try to glean valuable lessons from these unusual responders to identify protective factors at play. The idea that gleaning insights from a single patient or a handful of patients could be amplified and propagated to help countless others captivated the imagination of Adam Berkowitz, son of Ivan and Francesca, and the youngest of three children. “This is an opportunity to extract knowledge from very specific cases and generalize these insights to help people in Israel and around the world, and all we need is one of those insights to power a general extract,” Adam said. “That’s the beauty and the true power of data. The fact that with a single insight you could potentially help millions.” “With a little bit of money and the right scientists and the best data—or just about the best data out there—we are creating a petri dish from which many, many insights can be extracted for many years to benefit everybody,” he added. The vision and excitement are echoed by Adam’s siblings, Elizabeth Lewinsohn and Eric Berkowitz, who is the oldest of the three.

**Disease causes extinction.**

Dennis **Pamlin &** Stuart **Armstrong 15**. \*Executive Project Manager Global Risks, Global Challenges Foundation. \*\*James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford. February 2015, “Global Challenges: 12 Risks that threaten human civilization: The case for a new risk category,” Global Challenges Foundation, p.30-93. https://api.globalchallenges.org/static/wp-content/uploads/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact.pdf

A pandemic (from Greek πᾶν, pan, “all”, and δῆμος demos, “people”) is an epidemic of infectious disease that has spread through human populations across a **large region**; for instance **several continents**, or even **worldwide**. Here only worldwide events are included. A widespread endemic disease that is stable in terms of how many people become sick from it is not a pandemic. 260 84 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 3.1 Current risks 3.1.4.1 Expected impact disaggregation 3.1.4.2 Probability Influenza subtypes266 Infectious diseases have been one of the **greatest causes of mortality in history**. Unlike many other global challenges pandemics have happened recently, as we can see where reasonably good data exist. Plotting historic epidemic fatalities on a log scale reveals that these tend to follow a **power law with a small exponent**: many plagues have been found to follow a power law with exponent 0.26.261 These kinds of power laws are **heavy-tailed**262 to a significant degree.263 In consequence most of the fatalities are accounted for by the **top few events**.264 If this law holds for future pandemics as well,265 then the majority of people who will die from epidemics will likely die from the **single largest pandemic**. Most epidemic fatalities follow a power law, with some extreme events – such as the Black Death and Spanish Flu – being even more deadly.267 There are other grounds for suspecting that such a highimpact epidemic will have a **greater probability** than **usually assumed**. All the features of an extremely devastating disease **already exist in nature**: essentially **incurable** (Ebola268), nearly always **fatal** (rabies269), **extremely infectious** (common cold270), and **long incubation periods** (HIV271). If a pathogen were to emerge that somehow **combined these features** (and influenza has demonstrated **antigenic shift**, the ability to combine features from different viruses272), its death toll would be extreme. Many relevant features of the world have changed considerably, making past comparisons problematic. The modern world has better sanitation and medical research, as well as national and supra-national institutions dedicated to combating diseases. Private insurers are also interested in modelling pandemic risks.273 Set against this is the fact that **modern transport** and **dense human population** allow infections to spread much more rapidly274, and there is the potential for urban slums to serve as breeding grounds for disease.275 Unlike events such as nuclear wars, pandemics would not damage the world’s infrastructure, and initial survivors would likely be resistant to the infection. And there would probably be survivors, if only in isolated locations. Hence the risk of a civilisation collapse would come from the **ripple effect** of the fatalities and the policy responses. These would include **political and agricultural disruption** as well as **economic dislocation** and damage to the world’s **trade network** (including the food trade). **Extinction risk** is only possible if the aftermath of the epidemic **fragments and diminishes human society** to the extent that recovery becomes impossible277 before humanity succumbs to **other risks** (such as **climate change** or **further pandemics**). Five important factors in estimating the probabilities and impacts of the challenge: 1. What the true probability distribution for pandemics is, especially at the tail. 2. The capacity of modern international health systems to deal with an extreme pandemic. 3. How fast medical research can proceed in an emergency. 4. How mobility of goods and people, as well as population density, will affect pandemic transmission. 5. Whether humans can develop novel and effective anti-pandemic solutions.

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#### Neolib isn’t a monolithic root cause but pervasive – micropolitics disseminates post-Fordist productivity into remote terrains of lived experience to corrupt dissent.

Papadopoulos 8 (Dimitris, School of Social Science @Cardiff U, Leicester Reader in Sociology and Organisation. “In the ruins of representation: Identity, individuality, subjectification”, British Journal of Social Psychology, 47.1, ebsco//shree)

The turn to micropolitics and the dissolution of the foundationalist understandings of identity (either in its essentialist or discursive reductionist versions) enable political analyses of previously neglected and effaced domains of everyday life. But do micropolitics effectively challenge state regulation and open pathways for the emergence of a multiplicity of different modes of embodied subjectification? Or does embodied subjectification become a new mode of state regulated existence? The power of micropolitics is thought to lie in the fact that they bypass the reproduction of the state as an intact and paramount entity of power. Micropolitics harness everyday lived and embodied experience as a vital matter of political struggles which aim to reinvigorate civil society, that is, the struggles of associations of people which develop outside of state institutions (Warner, 2002). However, seen historically, since the 1980s micropolitics have increasingly become integral to the effective realization of neoliberal governance. This is because this mode of engagement is aligned with transformations which have occurred at the level of the state. The neoliberal state is not a monolithic container, rather it disseminates into the most remote terrains of everyday experience. The dismantling of welfare systems has accelerated, and finally consolidated, the state’s withdrawal from the traditional role of centralized organizer of society. However, the result has not been the disappearance of the state itself, rather we are witnessing the disappearance of the welfare state and the emergence of new one (Fairbrother & Rainnie, 2005; Jessop, 2002; Sassen, 1999). Social control is primarily performed through the colonization of previously regarded private areas of individual existence: the body, health, fashion and well-being, sexuality, your living-room. In this process, embodied subjectification and micropolitics have become necessary elements for the functioning of the neoliberal state. The neoliberal state needs, more than self-regulating individuals, networked actors who actively forge the structures necessary for the transformation from centralized state powers to disseminated modes of neoliberal regulation (Marazzi, 1998; Neilson & Rossiter, 2005; Papadopoulos, 2003; Stephenson, 2003). Hence, although they arose as an attempt to challenge the overly narrow focus on the state, micropolitics have played a vital role in shifting the historical function of the state from centralized control into a disseminated form of control which operates effectively in the terrain of social and cultural life. In this sense, both state- and micropolitics articulate their political agenda inside the terrain of the state and affirm its function and centrality in social life. This is the moment where embodied subjectification and the broader project of critical psychology amplify the production of affirmative subjectivity, a subjectivity which paradoxically solidifies state regulation by operating at its margins. However, the generation of affirmative subjectivity is more than a form of political regulation in contemporary North-Atlantic societies. It is also a productive force in the literal sense. The traditional apparatus for measuring and diagnosing individual differences was insufficient as a response to the social and economical transformations related to post-Fordist labour (Bowring, 2002; Gorz, 2004; Lazzarato, 2002; Moulier Boutang, 2003; Williams, 1994). This is because post-Fordism appropriates as productive resources precisely these forms of individual action and experience, which refer to the totality of individual subjectivity: relationality, emotions, memory, communication, creativity and primarily, the totality of the body. Critical psychology’s conceptualization captures the core tenet of the post-Fordist transformation in a magnificent way: embodied subjectification becomes the algorithm for the realization of the process of the ‘subjectivization of work’, a process which lies in the heart of post-Fordist productivity (Lohr & Nickel, 2005; Moldaschl & Voss, 2003; Scho¨nberger & Springer, 2003). Yet critical psychology neither traces possible ruptures in the post-Fordist arrangement nor explores everyday forms of exodus and disobedience (Moulier Boutang, 1998; Virno, 2004). In other words, the critical psychological view of subjectification can elucidate, or diagnose, the productive role of the psychology in the social earthquake which accompanied the post-Fordist reorganization of labour and everyday sociality in North-Atlantic societies (Gordo-Lo´pez & Pujol Tarre´s, 2004; Papadopoulos, 2004). However, critical psychology is unable to engage with the suppressed potentialities of post-Fordist social relations which could lead to forms of political engagement that question post-Fordism itself (Karakayali & Tsianos, 2005; Negri, 1999; Santos, 2001; Stephenson, 2004). The reason for this is, as I argued above, that embodied subjectification is the core productive form of today’s sociality. Embodied subjectification is not only a heuristic tool which enables social researchers to understand power relations in post-Fordist North-Atlantic societies, but also the very guarantor of what Weber (1978) calls ‘legitimate domination’. A form of domination which is actively and willingly performed differently by each individual and congeals a form of power, which, following Hannah Arendt (1970), emerges not as a means to dominate but by the very fact that people act together. Embodied subjectification (and its very theoreticization by governmentality studies) is a form of obedience to today’s configuration of power in North-Atlantic societies. In this sense, micropolitics and embodied subjectification constitute a form of affirmative subjectivity in neoliberal and post-Fordist conditions. In the last part of the paper, I will briefly discuss Jacques Rancie`re’s concept of politics as a means for interfering in the production of affirmative subjectivity (for a more broad discussion of this issue s. Stephenson & Papadopoulos, 2006).

#### The aff doesn’t break out of capitalism---it allows market forces to dictate what future humanity looks like

Alexander Thomas 17. PhD Candidate, University of East London, 7/31/17. “Super-intelligence and eternal life: transhumanism’s faithful follow it blindly into a future for the elite.” https://theconversation.com/super-intelligence-and-eternal-life-transhumanisms-faithful-follow-it-blindly-into-a-future-for-the-elite-78538

It’s also difficult to conceive of any aspect of humanity that could not be “improved” by being made more efficient at satisfying the demands of a competitive system. It is the system, then, that determines humanity’s evolution – without taking any view on what humans are or what they should be. One of the ways in which advanced capitalism proves extremely dynamic is in its ideology of moral and metaphysical neutrality. As philosopher Michael Sandel says: markets don’t wag fingers. In advanced capitalism, maximising one’s spending power maximises one’s ability to flourish – hence shopping could be said to be a primary moral imperative of the individual.

Philosopher Bob Doede rightly suggests it is this banal logic of the market that will dominate:

If biotech has rendered human nature entirely revisable, then it has no grain to direct or constrain our designs on it. And so whose designs will our successor post-human artefacts likely bear? I have little doubt that in our vastly consumerist, media-saturated capitalist economy, market forces will have their way. So – the commercial imperative would be the true architect of the future human.

Whether the evolutionary process is determined by a super-intelligent AI or advanced capitalism, we may be compelled to conform to a perpetual transcendence that only makes us more efficient at activities demanded by the most powerful system. The end point is predictably an entirely nonhuman – though very efficient – technological entity derived from humanity that doesn’t necessarily serve a purpose that a modern-day human would value in any way. The ability to serve the system effectively will be the driving force. This is also true of natural evolution – technology is not a simple tool that allows us to engineer ourselves out of this conundrum. But transhumanism could amplify the speed and least desirable aspects of the process.

#### Neolib commoditizes life, ensures inequality, eco-crisis

Harvey 5 (David, FBA is the Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography @ the Graduate Center of the City Univ. of New York, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, pgs 165-171//shree)

To presume that markets and market signals can best determine all allocative decisions is to presume that everything can in principle be treated as a commodity. Commodification presumes the existence of property rights over processes, things, and social relations, that a price can be put on them, and that they can be traded subject to legal contract. The market is presumed to work as an appropriate guide––an ethic––for all human action. In practice, of course, every society sets some bounds on where commodification begins and ends. Where the boundaries lie is a matter of contention. Certain drugs are deemed illegal. The buying and selling of sexual favours is outlawed in most US states, though elsewhere it may be legalized, decriminalized, and even state-regulated as an industry. Pornography is broadly protected as a form of free speech under US law although here, too, there are certain forms (mainly concerning children) that are considered beyond the pale. In the US, conscience and honour are supposedly not for sale, and there exists a curious penchant to pursue ‘corruption’ as if it is easily distinguishable from the normal practices of influence-peddling and making money in the marketplace. The commodification of sexuality, culture, history, heritage; of nature as spectacle or as rest cure; the extraction of monopoly rents from originality, authenticity, and uniqueness (of works or art, for example)––these all amount to putting a price on things that were never actually produced as commodities.17 There is often disagreement as to the appropriate- ness of commodification (of religious events and symbols, for example) or of who should exercise the property rights and derive the rents (over access to Aztec ruins or marketing of Aboriginal art, for example).¶ Neoliberalization has unquestionably rolled back the bounds of commodification and greatly extended the reach of legal contracts. It typically celebrates (as does much of postmodern theory) ephemerality and the short-term contract––marriage, for example, is understood as a short-term contractual arrangement rather than as a sacred and unbreakable bond. The divide between neoliberals and neoconservatives partially reflects a difference as to where the lines are drawn. The neoconservatives typically blame ‘liberals’, ‘Hollywood’, or even ‘postmodernists’ for what they see as the dissolution and immorality of the social order, rather than the corporate capitalists (like Rupert Murdoch) who actually do most of the damage by foisting all manner of sexually charged if not salacious material upon the world and who continually flaunt their pervasive preference for short-term over long-term commitments in their endless pursuit of profit.¶ But there are far more serious issues here than merely trying to protect some treasured object, some particular ritual or a preferred corner of social life from the monetary calculus and the short-term contract. For at the heart of liberal and neoliberal theory lies the necessity of constructing coherent markets for land, labour, and money, and these, as Karl Polanyi pointed out, ‘are obviously not commodities . . . the commodity description of labour, land, and money is entirely fictitious’. While capitalism cannot function without such fictions, it does untold damage if it fails to acknowledge the complex realities behind them. Polanyi, in one of his more famous passages, puts it this way:¶ To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity ‘labour power’ cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing of man’s labour power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity ‘man’ attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, the market administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous to business as floods and droughts in primitive society.18¶ The damage wrought through the ‘floods and droughts’ of fictitious capitals within the global credit system, be it in Indonesia, Argentina, Mexico, or even within the US, testifies all too well to Polanyi’s final point. But his theses on labour and land deserve further elaboration.¶ Individuals enter the labour market as persons of character, as individuals embedded in networks of social relations and socialized in various ways, as physical beings identifiable by certain characteristics (such as phenotype and gender), as individuals who have accumulated various skills (sometimes referred to as ‘human cap- ital’) and tastes (sometime referred to as ‘cultural capital’), and as living beings endowed with dreams, desires, ambitions, hopes, doubts, and fears. For capitalists, however, such individuals are a mere factor of production, though not an undifferentiated factor since employers require labour of certain qualities, such as physical strength, skills, flexibility, docility, and the like, appropriate to cer- tain tasks. Workers are hired on contract, and in the neoliberal scheme of things short-term contracts are preferred in order to maximize flexibility. Employers have historically used differentiations within the labour pool to divide and rule. Segmented labour markets then arise and distinctions of race, ethnicity, gen- der, and religion are frequently used, blatantly or covertly, in ways that redound to the employers’ advantage. Conversely, workers may use the social networks in which they are embedded to gain privileged access to certain lines of employment. They typically seek to monopolize skills and, through collective action and the creation of appropriate institutions, seek to regulate the labour market to protect their interests. In this they are merely construct- ing that ‘protective covering of cultural institutions’ of which Polanyi speaks.¶ Neoliberalization seeks to strip away the protective coverings that embedded liberalism allowed and occasionally nurtured. The general attack against labour has been two-pronged. The powers of trade unions and other working-class institutions are curbed or dismantled within a particular state (by violence if necessary). Flexible labour markets are established. State withdrawal from social welfare provision and technologically induced shifts in job structures that render large segments of the labour force redun- dant complete the domination of capital over labour in the market- place. The individualized and relatively powerless worker then confronts a labour market in which only short-term contracts are offered on a customized basis. Security of tenure becomes a thing of the past (Thatcher abolished it in universities, for example). A ‘personal responsibility system’ (how apt Deng’s language was!) is substituted for social protections (pensions, health care, protec- tions against injury) that were formerly an obligation of employers and the state. Individuals buy products in the markets that sell social protections instead. Individual security is therefore a matter of individual choice tied to the affordability of financial products embedded in risky financial markets.¶ The second prong of attack entails transformations in the spa- tial and temporal co-ordinates of the labour market. While too much can be made of the ‘race to the bottom’ to find the cheapest and most docile labour supplies, the geographical mobility of capital permits it to dominate a global labour force whose own geographical mobility is constrained. Captive labour forces abound because immigration is restricted. These barriers can be evaded only by illegal immigration (which creates an easily exploitable labour force) or through short-term contracts that permit, for example, Mexican labourers to work in Californian agribusiness only to be shamelessly shipped back to Mexico when they get sick and even die from the pesticides to which they are exposed.¶ Under neoliberalization, the figure of ‘the disposable worker’ emerges as prototypical upon the world stage.19 Accounts of the appalling conditions of labour and the despotic conditions under which labourers work in the sweatshops of the world abound. In China, the conditions under which migrant young women from rural areas work are nothing short of appalling: ‘unbearably long hours, substandard food, cramped dorms, sadistic managers who beat and sexually abuse them, and pay that arrives months late, or sometimes not at all’.20 In Indonesia, two young women recounted their experiences working for a Singapore-based Levi-Strauss subcontractor as follows:¶ We are regularly insulted, as a matter of course. When the boss gets angry he calls the women dogs, pigs, sluts, all of which we have to endure patiently without reacting. We work officially from seven in the morning until three (salary less than $2 a day), but there is often compulsory overtime, sometimes––especially if there is an urgent order to be delivered––until nine. However tired we are, we are not allowed to go home. We may get an extra 200 rupiah (10 US cents) . . . We go on foot to the factory from where we live. Inside it is very hot. The building has a metal roof, and there is not much space for all the workers. It is very cramped. There are over 200 people working there, mostly women, but there is only one toilet for the whole factory . . . when we come home from work, we have no energy left to do anything but eat and sleep . . .21¶ Similar tales come from the Mexican maquila factories, the Taiwanese- and Korean-operated manufacturing plants in Honduras, South Africa, Malaysia, and Thailand. The health haz- ards, the exposure to a wide range of toxic substances, and death on the job pass by unregulated and unremarked. In Shanghai, the Taiwanese businessman who ran a textile warehouse ‘in which 61 workers, locked in the building, died in a fire’ received a ‘lenient’ two-year suspended sentence because he had ‘showed repentance’ and ‘cooperated in the aftermath of the fire’.22¶ Women, for the most part, and sometimes children, bear the brunt of this sort of degrading, debilitating, and dangerous toil.23 The social consequences of neoliberalization are in fact extreme. Accumulation by dispossession typically undermines whatever powers women may have had within household production/ marketing systems and within traditional social structures and relocates everything in male-dominated commodity and credit markets. The paths of women’s liberation from traditional patri- archal controls in developing countries lie either through degrad- ing factory labour or through trading on sexuality, which varies from respectable work as hostesses and waitresses to the sex trade (one of the most lucrative of all contemporary industries in which a good deal of slavery is involved). The loss of social protec- tions in advanced capitalist countries has had particularly negative effects on lower-class women, and in many of the ex-communist countries of the Soviet bloc the loss of women’s rights through neoliberalization has been nothing short of catastrophic.¶ So how, then, do disposable workers––women in particular–– survive both socially and affectively in a world of flexible labour markets and short-term contracts, chronic job insecurities, lost social protections, and often debilitating labour, amongst the wreckage of collective institutions that once gave them a modicum of dignity and support? For some the increased flexibility in labour markets is a boon, and even when it does not lead to material gains the simple right to change jobs relatively easily and free of the traditional social constraints of patriarchy and family has intangible benefits. For those who successfully negotiate the labour market there are seemingly abundant rewards in the world of a capitalist consumer culture. Unfortunately, that culture, however spectacular, glamorous, and beguiling, perpetually plays with desires without ever conferring satisfactions beyond the limited identity of the shopping mall and the anxieties of status by way of good looks (in the case of women) or of material possessions. ‘I shop therefore I am’ and possessive individualism together con- struct a world of pseudo-satisfactions that is superficially exciting but hollow at its core. But for those who have lost their jobs or who have never managed to move out of the extensive informal economies that now provide a parlous refuge for most of the world’s disposable work- ers, the story is entirely different. With some 2 billion people condemned to live on less than $2 a day, the taunting world of capitalist consumer culture, the huge bonuses earned in financial services, and the self-congratulatory polemics as to the emancipa- tory potential of neoliberalization, privatization, and personal responsibility must seem like a cruel joke. From impoverished rural China to the affluent US, the loss of health-care protections and the increasing imposition of all manner of user fees adds considerably to the financial burdens of the poor.24

#### Vote neg for a historical materialist world-systems approach.

Chase-Dunn 99 (Chris, Christopher Chase-Dunn is Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Research on World-Systems at the University of California-Riverside. He received his Ph.D in Sociology from Stanford University in 1975. Chase-Dunn has done crossnational quantitative studies of the effects of dependence on foreign investment and he studies cities and settlement systems in order to explain human sociocultural evolution. His research focuses on interpolity systems, including both the modern global political economy and earlier regional world-systems. One project examines the causes of the expansion and collapse of cities and empires in several regional world-systems as well as the contemporary process of global state formation. His research has been supported by the National Science Foundation. Chase-Dunn is the founder and former editor of the Journal of World-Systems Research. and the Series Editor of a book series published by The Johns Hopkins University Press. In 2001 he was elected a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. In 2002 he was elected President of the Research Committee on Economy and Society (RC02) of the International Sociological Association. And in 2008 he was elected Distinguished Senior Scholar of the International Political Economy (IPE) section of the International Studies Association. “Globalization: A World-Systems Perspective.” Journal of World-Systems Research, v2, summer, p 188-206//shree)

Today the terms “world economy”, “world market”, and “globalization” are commonplace, appearing in the sound-bites of politicians, media commentators, and unemployed workers alike. But few know that the most important source for these phrases lies with work started by sociologists in the early Seventies. At a time when the mainstream assumption of accepted social, political, and economic science held that the “wealth of nations” reflected mainly on the cultural developments within those nations, a growing group of social scientists recognized that national “development” could be best understood as the complex outcome of local interactions with an aggressively expanding Europe-centered “world-system” (Wallerstein 1974; Frank 1978).1 Not only did these scientists perceive the global nature of economic networks 20 years before they entered popular discourse, but they also saw that many of these networks extend back at least 600 years. Over this time, the peoples of the globe became linked into one integrated unit: the modern world-system. Now, 20 years on, social scientists working in the area are trying to understand the history and evolution of the whole system, as well as how local, national and regional entities have been integrated into it. This current research has required broadening our perspective to include deeper temporal and larger spatial frameworks. For example, some recent research has compared the modern Europe-centered world-system of the last six hundred years with earlier, smaller intersocietal networks that have existed for millennia (Frank and Gills 1993; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). Other work uses the knowledge of cycles and trends that has grown out of world-systems research to anticipate likely future events with a precision impossible before the advent of the theory. This is still a new field and much remains to be done, but enough has already been achieved to provide a valuable understanding of the phenomenon of globalization. The discourse about globalization has emerged mainly in the last decade. The term means many different things, and there are many reasons for its emergence as a popular concept. The usage of this term generally implies that a recent change (within the last decade or two) has occurred in technology and in the size of the arena of economic competition. The general idea is that information technology has created a context in which the global market, rather than separate national markets, is the relevant arena for economic competition. It then follows that economic competitiveness needs to be assessed in the global context, rather than in a national or local context. These notions have been used to justify the adoption of new practices by firms and governments all over the world and these developments have altered the political balances among states, firms, unions and other interest groups. The first task is to put this development into historical context. The world-systems perspective has shown that intersocietal geopolitics and geoeconomics has been the relevant arena of competition for national-states, firms and classes for hundreds of years. The degree of international connectedness of economic and political/military networks was already important in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The first “transnational corpora-tions” (TNCs) were the great chartered companies of the seventeenth century. They organized both production and exchange on an intercontinental scale. The rise and fall of hegemonic core powers, which continues today with the relative decline of the United States hegemony, was already in full operation in the seventeenth century rise and fall of Dutch hegemony (see Arrighi 1994; Modelski and Thompson 1996; Taylor 1996). The capitalist world-economy has experienced cyclical processes and secular trends for hundreds of years (Chase-Dunn 1998:Chapter 2). The cyclical processes include the rise and fall of hegemons, the Kondratieff wave (a forty to sixty year business cycle)2 , a cycle of warfare among core states (Goldstein 1988), and cycles of colonization and decolonization (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980). The world-system has also experienced several secular trends including a long-term proletarianization of the world work force, growing concentration of capital into larger and larger firms, increasing internationalization of capital investment and of trade, and accelerating internationalization of political structures. In this perspective, globalization is a long-term upward trend of political and economic change that is affected by cyclical processes. The most recent technological changes, and the expansions of international trade and investment, are part of these long-run changes. One question is exactly how the most recent changes compare with the long-run trends? And what are the important continuities as well as the qualitative differences that accompany these changes? These are the questions that I propose to explore. types of globalization There are at least five different dimensions of globalization that need to be distinguished. There are also several misunderstandings and misinterpretations that need to be clarified. Let us evaluate five different meanings of globalization: (1) Common ecological constraints This aspect of globalization involves global threats due to our fragile ecosystem and the globalization of ecological risks. Anthropogenic causes of ecological degradation have long operated, and these in turn have affected human social evolution (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). But ecological degradation has only recently begun to operate on a global scale. This fact creates a set of systemic constraints that require global collective action. (2) Cultural globalization This aspect of globalization relates to the diffusion of two sets of cultural phenomena: • the proliferation of individualized values, originally of Western origin, to ever larger parts of the world population. These values are expressed in social constitutions that recognize individual rights and identities and transnational and international efforts to protect “human rights.” • the adoption of originally Western institutional practices. Bureaucratic organization and rationality, belief in a law-like natural universe, the values of economic efficiency and political democracy have been spreading throughout the world since they were propagated in the European Enlightenment (Meyer 1996; Markoff 1996). Whereas some of the discussions of the world polity assume that cultural components have been a central aspect of the modern world-system from the start (e.g. Meyer 1989; Mann 1986), I emphasize the comparatively non-normative nature of the modern world-system (Chase-Dunn 1998: Chapter 5). But I acknowledge the growing salience of cultural consensus in the last 100 years. Whereas the modern world-system has always been, and is still, multicultural, the growing influence and acceptance of Western values of rationality, individualism, equality, and efficiency is an important trend of the twentieth century. (3) Globalization of communication Another meaning of globalization is connected with the new era of information technology. Anthony Giddens(1996) insists that social space comes to acquire new qualities with generalized electronic communications, albeit only in the networked parts of the world. In terms of accessibility, cost and velocity, the hitherto more local political and geographic parameters that structured social relationships are greatly expanded. One may well argue that time-space compression (Harvey 1989) by new information technologies is simply an extension and acceleration of the very long-term trend toward technological development over the last ten millenia (Chase-Dunn 1994). Yet, the rapid decrease in the cost of communications may have qualitatively altered the relationship between states and consciousness and this may be an important basis for the formation of a much stronger global civil society. Global communication facilities have the power to move things visible and invisible from one part of the globe to another whether any nation-state likes it or not. This applies not only to economic exchange, but also to ideas, and these new networks of communication can create new political groups and alignments. How, and to what extent, will this undermine the power of states to structure social relationships? (4) Economic globalization Economic globalization means globe-spanning economic relationships. The interrelationships of markets, finance, goods and services, and the networks created by transnational corporations are the most important manifestations of this. Though the capitalist world-system has been international in essence for centuries, the extent and degree of trade and investment globalization has increased greatly in recent decades. Economic globalization has been accelerated by what information technology has done to the movement of money. It is commonly claimed that the market’s ability to shift money from one part of the globe to another by the push of a button has changed the rules of policy-making, putting economic decisions much more at the mercy of market forces than before. The world-system has undergone major waves of economic globalization before, especially in the last decades of the the nineteenth century. One important question is whether or not the most recent wave has actually integrated the world to a qualitatively greater extent that it was integrated during the former wave. All the breathy discussions of global capitalism and global society assume that this is the case, but careful comparative research indicates that this is not so (see below and Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000). (5) Political globalization Political globalization consists of the institutionalization of international political structures. The Europe-centered world-system has been primarily constituted as an interstate system—a system of conflicting and allying states and empires. Earlier world-systems, in which accumulation was mainly accomplished by means of institutionalized coercive power, experienced an oscillation between multicentric interstate systems and core-wide world empires in which a single “universal” state conquered all or most of the core states in a region. The Europe-centered system has also experienced a cyclical alternation between political centralization and decentralization, but this has taken the form of the rise and fall of hegemonic core states that do not conquer the other core states. Hence the modern world-system has remained multicentric in the core, and this is due mainly to the shift toward a form of accumulation based more on the production and profitable sale of commodities—capitalism. The hegemons have been the most thoroughly capitalist states and they have preferred to follow a strategy of controlling trade and access to raw material imports from the periphery rather than conquering other core states to extract tribute or taxes. Power competition in an interstate system does not require much in the way of cross-state cultural consensus to operate systemically. But since the early nineteenth century the European interstate system has been developing both an increasingly consensual international normative order and a set of international political structures that regulate all sorts of interaction. This phenomenon has been termed “global governance” by Craig Murphy (1994) and others. It refers to the growth of both specialized and general international organizations. The general organizations that have emerged are the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations and the United Nations. The sequence of these “proto-world-states” constitutes a process of institution-building, but unlike earlier “universal states” this one is slowly emerging by means of condominium among core states rather than conquest. This is the trend of political globalization. It is yet a weak, but persistent, concentration of sovereignty in international institutions. If it continues it will eventuate in a single global state that could effectively outlaw warfare and enforce its illegality. The important empirical question, analogous to the discussion of economic globalization above, is the relative balance of power between international and global political organizations vis a vis national states. We assume this to be an upward trend, but like economic globalization it probably is also a cycle. Measuring Economic Globalization The brief discussion above of economic globalization implies that it is a long-run upward trend. The idea is that international economic competition as well as geopolitical competition were already important in the fourteenth century and that they became increasingly important as more and more international trade and international investment occurred. In its simplest form this would posit a linear upward trend of economic globalization. An extreme alternative hypothesis about economic globalization would posit a completely unintegrated world composed of autarchic national economies until some point (perhaps in the last few decades) at which a completely global market for commodities and capital suddenly emerged. Let us examine data that can tell us more about the temporal emergence of economic globalization. There are potentially a large number of different indicators of economic globalization and they may or may not exhibit similar patterns with respect to change over time. Trade globalization can be operationalized as the proportion of all world production that crosses international boundaries. Investment globalization would be the proportion of all invested capital in the world that is owned by non-nationals (i.e. “foreigners”). And we could also investigate the degree of economic integration of countries by determining the extent to which national economic growth rates are correlated across countries. 3 It would be ideal to have these measures over several centuries, but comparable fi gures are not available before the nineteenth century, and indeed even these are sparse and probably unrepresentative of the whole system until well into the twentieth century. Nevertheless we can learn some important things by examining those comparable data that are available. Figure 1 shows trade and investment globalization. Trade globalization is the ratio of estimated total world exports (the sum of the value of exports of all countries) divided by an estimate of total world product (the sum of all the national GDPs). Investment globalization is the total book value of all foreign direct investment divided by the total world product. The trade globalization figures show the hypothesized upward trend as well as a downturn that occurred between 1929 and 1950. Note that the time scale in Figure 1 is distorted by the paucity of data before 1950. It is possible that important changes in trade globalization are not visible in this series because of the wide temporal gaps in the data. Indeed a more recent study has shown that this is the case. There was a shorter and less well-defined wave of trade globalization from 1900 to 1929 (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000). Figure 1 also shows that the trade indicator differs in some ways from the investment indicator. Investment globalization was higher (or as high) in 1913 as it was in 1991, while trade globalization was considerably lower in 1913 than it was in 1992. We have fewer time points for the investment data, so we cannot tell for sure about the shape of the changes that took place, but these two series imply that different indicators of economic globalization may show somewhat different trajectories. More research needs to be done on investment globalization to determine its exact trajectory and for comparison with trade globalization and other world-system cycles and trends. A third indicator of economic globalization is the correlation of national GDP growth rates (Grimes 1993). This shows the extent to which periods of national economic growth and stagnation have been synchronized across countries. In a fully integrated global economy it would be expected that growth and stagnation periods would be synchronized across countries and so there would be a high correlation of national growth rates. Grimes shows that, contrary to the hypothesis of a secular upward trend toward increasing global integration, the correlation among national growth rates fluctuates cyclically over the past two centuries. In a data series from 1860 to 1988 Grimes found two periods in which national economic growth decline sequences are highly correlated across countries: - 1913-1927; and after 1970. Before and in between these peaks are periods of very low synchronization. Further research needs to be done to determine the temporal patterns of different sorts of economic globalization. At this point we can say that the step-function version of a sudden recent leap to globalization can be rejected. The evidence we have indicates that there are both long-term secular trends and huge cyclical oscillations. Trade globalization shows a long-term trend with a big dip during the depression of the 1930s. The investment globalization indicates a cycle with at least two peaks, one before World War I and one after 1980. Grimes’s indicator of synchronous economic growth indicates a cyclical fluctuation with one peak in the 1920s and another since 1970. These results, especially those that imply cycles, indicate that change occurs relatively quickly and that the most recent period of globalization shares important features with earlier periods of intense international economic interaction. The question of the similarities and differences between the most recent wave and earlier waves of globalization is clearly an important one. systemic cycles of accumulation Giovanni Arrighi (1994) shows how hegemony in the modern world system has evolved in a series of “systemic cycles of accumulation” (SCAs) in which finance capital has employed different forms of organization and different relationships with organized state power. These qualitative organizational changes have accompanied the secular increase in the power of money and markets as regulatory forces in the modern world-system. The SCAs have been occurring in the Europe-centered world-system since at least the fourteenth century. Arrighi’s model shows both the similarities and the differences in the relationships that obtain between financial capital and states within the different systemic cycles of accumulation. The British SCA and the American SCA had both similarities and important differences. The main differences that Arrighi emphasizes are the “internalization of transaction costs” (represented by the vertical integration of TNCs) and the extent to which the U.S. tried to create “organized capitalism” on a global scale. The British SCA had fewer global firms and pushed hard for international free trade. The U.S. SCA is characterized by a much heavier focus on global firms and by a more structured approach to “global governance” possibly intended to produce economic growth in other core regions, especially those that are geopolitically strategic. Arrighi argues that President Roosevelt used the power of the hegemonic state to try to create a balanced world of capitalist growth. This sometimes meant going against the preferences of finance capital and U.S. corporations. For example, the Japanese miracle was made possible because the U.S. government prevented U.S. corporations from turning Japan (and Korea) into just one more dependent and peripheralized country. This policy of enlightened global Keynesianism was continued in a somewhat constrained form under later presidents, albeit in the guise of domestic “military Keynesianism” justified by the Soviet threat. In this interpretation the big companies and the finance capitalists returned to power with the decline in competitiveness of the U.S. economy. The rise of the Eurodollar market forced Nixon to abandon the Bretton Woods financial structure, and this was followed by ReaganismThatcherism, IMF structural adjustment, streamlining, deregulation and the delegitimation of anything that constrained the desires of global capital investment. The idea that we are all subject to the forces of a global market-place, and that any constraint on the freedom to invest will result in a deficit of “competitiveness,” is a powerful justification for destroying the institutions of the “Second Wave” (e.g. labor unions, welfare, agricultural subsidies, etc.).4 Under conditions of increased economic globalization the ability of national states to protect their citizens from world market forces decreases. This results increasing inequalities within countries, and increasing levels of dis-satisfaction compared to the relative harmony of national integration achieved under the Keynesian regimes. It is also produces political reactions, especially national-populist movements.5 Indeed, Philip McMichael (1996) attributes the anti-government movements now occurring in the U.S. West, including the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, to the frustrations caused by the deregulation of U.S. agriculture. It would also be useful to investigate the temporal patterns of the other types of globalization: cultural,6 political, technological and ecological. Of interest too are the relationships between these and economic globalization. Much empirical work needs to be done to operationalize these concepts and to assemble the relevant information. Here, for now, I will hypothesize that all these types exhibit both long-run secular and cyclical features. I will also surmise that cultural and political globalization are lagged behind the secular upward trend of economic globalization. the politics of globalization This last hypothesis bears on the question of adjustments of political and social institutions to increases in economic and technological globalization. I would submit that the current period of economic globalization has occurred in part due to technological changes that are linked to Kondratieff waves, and in part because of the profit squeezes and declining hegemony of the U.S. economy in the larger world market. 7 The financial aspects of the current period of economic globalization began when President Nixon canceled the Bretton Woods agreement in response to pressures on the value of the U.S. dollar coming from the rapidly growing Eurodollar market (Harvey 1995). This occurred in 1967, and this date is used by many to mark the beginning of a K-wave downturn. The saturation of the world market demand for the products of the post-World War II upswing, the constraints on capital accumulation posed by business unionism and the political entitlements of the welfare states in core countries caused a profit squeeze that motivated large firms and investors and their political helpers to try to break out of these constraints. The possibilities for global investment opened up by new communications and information technology created new maneuverability for capital. The demise of the Soviet Union8 added legitimacy to the revitalized ideology of the free market and this ideology swept the Earth. Not only Reagan and Thatcher, but Eurocommunists and labor governments in both the core and the periphery, adopted the ideology of the “lean state,” deregulation, privatization and the notion that everything must be evaluated in terms of global efficiency and competitiveness. Cultural globalization has been a very long-term upward trend since the emergence of the world religions in which any person, regardless of ethnicity or kinship, could become a member of the moral community by confessing faith in the “universal” god. But moral and political cosmography has usually encompassed a smaller realm than the real dimensions of the objective trade and political/military networks in which people have been involved. What has occurred at the end of the twentieth century is a near convergence between subjective cosmography and objective networks. The main cause of this is probably the practical limitation of human habitation to the planet Earth. But the long-run declining costs of transportation and communications are also an important element. Whatever the causes, the emergent reality is one in which consciousness embraces (or goes beyond) the real systemic networks of interaction. This geographical feature of the global system is one of its uniquenesses, and it makes possible for the future a level of normative order that has not existed since human societies were very small and egalitarian (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997a). The ideology of globalization has undercut the support and the rationale behind all sorts of so-called Second Wave institutions—labor unions, socialist parties, welfare programs, and communist states. While these institutions have not been destroyed everywhere, the politicians of the right (e.g. Newt Gingrich in the U.S.) have explicitly argued for their elimination. At the same time, the very technologies that made capitalist economic globalization possible also have the potential to allow those who do not benefit from the free reign of capital to organize new forms of resistance, or to revitalize old forms. It is now widely agreed by many, even in the financial community, that the honeymoon of neo-liberalism will eventually end and that the rough edges of global capitalism will need to be buffed. Patrick Buchanan, a conservative candidate for the U.S. presidency in 1996, tried to capitalize on popular resentment of corporate downsizing. The Wall Street Journal has reported that stock analysts worry about the “lean and mean” philosophy becoming a fad that has the potential to delegitimate the business system and to create political backlashes. This was expressed in the context of a discussion of the announcement of huge bonuses for AT&T executives following another round of downsizing. I already mentioned the difficulties that states are having in controlling communications on the Internet. I do not believe the warnings of those who predict a massive disruption of civilization by hordes of sociopaths waging “cyberwar”9 But I do think that the new communications technologies provide new opportunities for the less powerful to organize themselves to respond should global capitalism run them over or leave them out. The important question is what are the most useful organizational forms for resistance? What we already see are all sorts of nutty localisms, nationalisms and a proliferation of identity politics. The militias of the U.S. West are ordering large amounts of fertilizer with which to resist the coming of the “Blue Helmets”—a fantasized world state that is going to take away their handguns and assualt rifles.10 Localisms and specialized identities are the postmodern political forms that are supposedly produced by information technology, flexible specialization, and global capitalism (Harvey 1989). I think that at least some of this trend is a result of desperation and the demise of plausible alternatives in the face of the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism and the much-touted triumph of efficiency over justice. Be that as it may, a historical perspective on the latest phase of globalization allows us to see the long-run patterns of interaction between capitalist expansion and the movements of opposition that have tried to protect people from the negative aspects of market forces and exploitation. And this perspective has implications for going beyond the impasse of the present to build a more cooperative and humane global system (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 1999). the spiral of capitalism and socialism The interaction between expansive commodification and resistance movements can be denoted as “the spiral of capitalism and socialism.” The world-systems perspective provides a view of the long-term interaction between the expansion and deepening of capitalism and the efforts of people to protect themselves from exploitation and domination. The historical development of the communist states is explained as part of a long-run spiraling interaction between expanding capitalism and socialist counter-responses. The history and developmental trajectory of the communist states can be explained as socialist movements in the semiperiphery that attempted to transform the basic logic of capitalism, but which ended up using socialist ideology to mobilize industrialization for the purpose of catching up with core capitalism. The spiraling interaction between capitalist development and socialist movements can be seen in the history of labor movements, socialist parties and communist states over the last 200 years. This long-run comparative perspective enables one to see recent events in China, Russia and Eastern Europe in a framework that has implications for the future of social democracy. The metaphor of the spiral means this: both capitalism and socialism affect one another’s growth and organizational forms. Capitalism spurs socialist responses by exploiting and dominating peoples, and socialism spurs capitalism to expand its scale of production and market integration and to revolutionize technology. Defined broadly, socialist movements are those political and organizational means by which people try to protect themselves from market forces, exploitation and domination, and to build more cooperative institutions. The sequence of industrial revolutions, by which capitalism has restructured production and taken control of labor, have stimulated a series of political organizations and institutions created by workers to protect their livelihoods. This happened differently under different political and economic conditions in different parts of the world-system. Skilled workers created guilds and craft unions. Less skilled workers created industrial unions. Sometimes these coalesced into labor parties that played important roles in supporting the development of political democracies, mass education and welfare states (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). In other regions workers were less politically successful, but managed at least to protect access to rural areas or subsistence plots for a fall-back or hedge against the insecurities of employment in capitalist enterprises. To some extent the burgeoning contemporary “informal sector” in both core and peripheral societies provides such a fall-back. The mixed success of workers’ organizations also had an impact on the further development of capitalism. In some areas workers or communities were successful at raising the wage bill or protecting the environment in ways that raised the costs of production for capital. When this happened capitalists either displaced workers by automating them out of jobs or capital migrated to where fewer constraints allowed cheaper production. The process of capital flight is not a new feature of the world-system. It has been an important force behind the uneven development of capitalism and the spreading scale of market integration for centuries. Labor unions and socialist parties were able to obtain some power in certain states, but capitalism became yet more international. Firm size increased. International markets became more and more important to successful capitalist competition. Fordism, the employment of large numbers of easily-organizable workers in centralized production locations, has been supplanted by “flexible accumulation” (small firms producing small customized products) and global sourcing (the use of substitutable components from broadly dispersed competing producers), are all production strategies that make traditional labor organizing approaches much less viable. communist states in the world-system Socialists were able to gain state power in certain semiperipheral states and use this power to create political mechanisms of protection against competition with core capital. This was not a wholly new phenomenon. As discussed below, capitalist semiperipheral states had done and were doing similar things. But, the communist states claimed a fundamentally oppositional ideology in which socialism was allegedly a superior system that would eventually replace capitalism. Ideological opposition is a phenomenon which the capitalist world-economy has seen before. The geopolitical and economic battles of the Thirty Years War were fought in the name of Protestantism against Catholicism. The content of the ideology may make some difference for the internal organization of states and parties, but every contender must be able to legitimate itself in the eyes and hearts of its cadre. The claim to represent a qualitatively different and superior socio-economic system is not evidence that the communist states were indeed structurally autonomous from world capitalism. The communist states severely restricted the access of core capitalist firms to their internal markets and raw materials, and this constraint on the mobility of capital was an important force behind the post-World War II upsurge in the spatial scale of market integration and a new revolution of technology. In certain areas capitalism was driven to further revolutionize technology or to improve living conditions for workers and peasants because of the demonstration effect of propinquity to a communist state. U.S. support for state-led industrialization of Japan and Korea (in contrast to U.S. policy in Latin America) is only understandable as a geopolitical response to the Chinese revolution. The existence of “two superpowers”—one capitalist and one communist—in the period since World War II provided a fertile context for the success of international liberalism within the “capitalist” bloc. This was the political/military basis of the rapid growth of transnational corporations and the latest revolutionary “time-space compression” (Harvey 1989). This technological revolution has once again restructured the international division of labor and created a new regime of labor regulation called “flexible accumulation.” The process by which the communist states have become reintegrated into the capitalist world-system has been long, as described below. But, the final phase of reintegration was provoked by the inability to be competitive with the new form of capitalist regulation. Thus, capitalism spurs socialism, which spurs capitalism, which spurs socialism again in a wheel that turns and turns while getting larger. The economic reincorporation of the communist states into the capitalist world-economy did not occur recently and suddenly. It began with the mobilization toward autarchic industrialization using socialist ideology, an effort that was quite successful in terms of standard measures of economic development. Most of the communist states were increasing their percentage of world product and energy consumption up until the 1980s. The economic reincorporation of the communist states moved to a new stage of integration with the world market and foreign firms in the 1970s. Andre Gunder Frank (1980:chapter 4) documented a trend toward reintegration in which the communist states increased their exports for sale on the world market, increased imports from the avowedly capitalist countries, and made deals with transnational firms for investments within their borders. The economic crisis in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was not much worse than the economic crisis in the rest of the world during the global economic downturn that began in the late 1960s (see Boswell and Peters 1990, Table 1). Data presented by World Bank analysts indicates that GDP growth rates were positive in most of the “historically planned economies” in Europe until 1989 or 1990 (Marer et al, 1991: Table 7a). Put simply, the big transformations that occurred in the Soviet Union and China after 1989 were part of a process that had long been underway since the 1970s. The big socio-political changes were a matter of the superstructure catching up with the economic base. The democratization of these societies is, of course, a welcome trend, but democratic political forms do not automatically lead to a society without exploitation or domination. The outcomes of current political struggles are rather uncertain in most of the ex-communist countries. New types of authoritarian regimes seem at least as likely as real democratization. As trends in the last two decades have shown, austerity regimes, deregulation and marketization within nearly all of the communist states occurred during the same period as similar phenomena in non-communist states. The synchronicity and broad similarities between Reagan/Thatcher deregulation and attacks on the welfare state, austerity socialism in most of the rest of the world, and increasing pressures for marketization in the Soviet Union and China are all related to the B-phase downturn of the Kondratieff wave, as are the current moves toward austerity and privatization in many semiperipheral and peripheral states. The trend toward privatization, deregulation and market-based solutions among parties of the Left in almost every country is thoroughly documented by Lipset (1991). Nearly all socialists with access to political power have abandoned the idea of doing more than buffing off the rough edges of capitalism. The way in which the pressures of a stagnating world economy impact upon national policies certainly varies from country to country, but the ability of any single national society to construct collective rationality is limited by its interaction within the larger system. The most recent expansion of capitalist integration, termed “globalization of the economy,” has made autarchic national economic planning seem anachronistic. Yet, a political reaction against economic globalization is now under way in the form of revived ex-communist parties, economic nationalism (e.g., Pat Buchanan, the Brazilian military) and a coalition of oppositional forces who are critiquing the ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism (e.g., Ralph Nader, environmentalists, populists of the right, etc.). Political Implications of the World-System Perspective The age of U.S. hegemonic decline and the rise of post-modernist philosophy have cast the liberal ideology of the European Enlightenment (science, progress, rationality, liberty, democracy and equality) into the dustbin of totalizing universalisms. It is alleged that these values have been the basis of imperialism, domination and exploitation and, thus, they should be cast out in favor of each group asserting its own set of values. Note that self-determination and a considerable dose of multiculturalism (especially regarding religion) were already central elements in Enlightenment liberalism. The structuralist and historical materialist world-systems approach poses this problem of values in a different way. The problem with the capitalist world-system has not been with its values. The philosophy of liberalism is fine. It has quite often been an embarrassment to the pragmatics of imperial power and has frequently provided justifications for resistance to domination and exploitation. The philosophy of the enlightenment has never been a major cause of exploitation and domination. Rather, it was the military and economic power generated by capitalism that made European hegemony possible.

### Case---1NC

#### Vote Neg on presumption---their method does nothing to change dominant discourses or structures that perpetuate violence. Their challenge to this has no means of spilling outside of debate, which is necessary for them to solve any of their impacts---their belief that it does is cruel optimism, which turns case.

#### Guilt Assuasion DA---their performative declaration of anti-whiteness is a feel-good tactic that dissuades judges from pursuing truly radical politics.

Ahmed 4 (Sara Ahmed The University of Lancaster “Declarations of Whiteness: The Non-Performativity of Anti-Racism” borderlands Vol. 3 no. 2, 2004)

11. My commentary on the risks of whiteness studies will involve an analysis of how **whiteness gets reproduced through being declared**, within academic texts, as well public culture. I will hence be reading Whiteness Studies as part of a broader shift towards what we could call a **politics of declaration**, in which institutions as well as individuals ‘admit’ to forms of bad practice, and in which **the ‘admission’ itself becomes seen as good practice**. By reading Whiteness Studies in this way, I am not suggesting that it is a symptom of bad practice: rather, I think it is useful to consider ‘turns’ within the academy as having something to do with other cultural turns. The examples are drawn from the UK and Australia, as the two places in which my own anti-racist politics have taken shape. My argument is simple: anti-racism is not performative. I use performative in Austin’s (1975) sense as referring to a particular class of speech. An utterance is performative when it does what it says: ‘the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action’ (1975, 6).

12. I will suggest that declaring whiteness, or even ‘admitting’ to one’s own racism, when the declaration is assumed to be ‘evidence’ of an anti-racist commitment, **does not do what it says**. In other words, **putting whiteness into speech, as an object to be spoken about**, however critically, **is not an anti-racist action, and nor does it necessarily commit a state, institution or person to a form of action that we could describe as anti-racist**. To put this more strongly, I will show how declaring one’s whiteness, **even as part of a** project of social **critique, can reproduce white privilege in ways that are ‘unforeseen’**. Of course, this is not to reduce whiteness studies to the reproduction of whiteness, even if that is what it can do. As Mike Hill suggests: ‘I cannot know in advance whether white critique will prove politically worthwhile, whether in the end it will be a friendlier ghost than before or will display the same stealth narcissism that feminists of color labeled a white problem in the late 1970s’ (1997, 10)

#### Humanism is key to mobilize movements to stop warming---reject the impulse to defer to transhumanism.

Karenga 6—Professor and Chair Department of Africa Studies at Cal State University and a major figure in the Black Power movement [Maulana, *Philosophy in the African Tradition of Resistance: Issues or Human Freedom and Human Flourishing in Not Only The Master’s Tools*, 2006, p. 242-5]

Surely, we are at a moment of history fraught with new and old fOnTIS of anxiety, alienation, and antagonism; deepening poverty in the midst of increasing wealth; proposals and practices of ethnic cleansing and genocide; pandemic diseases; increased plunder; pollution and depletion of the environment; constant conflicts, large and small; and world-threatening delusions on the part of a superpower aspiring to a return to empire, with spurious claims of the right to preemptive aggression, to openly attack and overthrow nonfavored and fragile governments openly, and to seize the lands and resources of vulnerable peoples and establish "democracy" through military dictatorship abroad, all the while suppressing political dissent at home (Chang 2002; Cole et at. 2002). These anxieties are undergirded by racist and religious chauvinism, by the self-righteous and veiled references of these rulers to themselves as a kind of terrible and terrorizing hand of God, appointed to rid the world of evil (Ahmad 2002; Arnin 2001; Blum1995). At the same time, in this context of turmoil and terror and the use and threatened use of catastrophic weapons, there is the irrational and arrogant expectation that the oppressed will acquiesce, abandon resistance, and accept the disruptive and devastating consequences of globalization, along with the global hegemony it implies (Martin and Schumann 1997). There is great alarm among the white-supremicist rulers of these globalizing nations, given the metical resistance rising up against them, even as globalization’s technological, organizational, and economic capacity continues to expand (Barber 1996; Karenga 2002e, 2003a; Lusane 1997). There is great alarm when people who should "know" when they are defeated ridicule the assessment, refuse to be defeated or dispirited, and, on the contrary, intensify and diversify their struggles (Zepezauer 2002). Certainly the battlefields of Palestine, Venezuela, long suffering Haiti, and Chiapas, Mexico, along with other continuing emancipatory struggles everywhere, reaffirm the indomitable character of the human spirit and the durability and adaptive vitality of a people determined to be free, regardless of the odds and assessments against them. Indeed, they remind us that the motive force of history is struggle, informed by the ongoing quest for freedom, justice, power of the masses, and peace in the world. Despite "end of history" claims and single-super- power resolve and resolutions, these struggles continue. For still the oppressed want freedom, the wronged and injured want justice, the people want power over their destiny and daily lives, and the world wants peace. And all over the world-especially in this U.S. citadel of aging capitalism with its archaic dreams of empire-clarity in the analysis of issues, and in the critical determination of tasks and prospects, requires the deep and disciplined reflection characteristic of the personal and social practice we call philosophy. But this sense of added urgency for effective intervention is prompted not only by the critical juncture at which we stand but also by an awareness of our long history of resistance as a people, because in our collective strivings and social struggles we seek a new future for our people, our descendants, and the world. Joined also to these conditions and considerations is the compelling character of our self-understanding as a people, as a moral vanguard in this country and the world. For we have launched, fought, and won with our allies struggles that not only have expanded the realm of freedom in this country and the world but also have served as an ongoing inspiration and a model of liberation struggles for other marginalized and oppressed peoples and groups throughout the world. Indeed, they have borrowed from and built on our moral vocabulary and moral vision, sung our songs of freedom, and held up our struggle for liberation as a model to emulate. Now, self-understanding and self-assertion are dialectically linked. In other words, how we understand ourselves in the world determines how we assert ourselves in the world. Thus, an expansive concept of ourselves as Africans-continental and diasporan-and as Africana philosophers forms an essential component of our sense of mission and the urgency with which we approach it. It is important to note that I have conceived and written this chapter within the framework of Kausaida philosophy (Karenga 1978, 1980, 1997) Kawaida is a philosophic initiative that was forged in the crucible of ideological and practical struggles around issues of freedom, justice, equalitys, self-determination, conullunal power, self-defense, pan~African- ism, coalition and alliance, Black Studies, intellectual emancipation, and cultural recovery and reconstlouction. It continued to develop in the midst of these ongoing struggies within the life of the mind and stmggles iottbtn the life of the people, as well as within the context of the conditions of the world. Kawaida is defined as an ongoing synthesis of the best of xAfrican thought and practice in constant exchange tuttb tl3e 'U)()ltd. It characterizes culture as a unique, instructive and valuable way of being human in the world-as a foundation and framework for self-understanding and self-assertion. As a philosophy of culture and struggle, Kawaida maintains that our intellectual and social practice as Nricana activist scholars must be undergirded and informed by ongoing efforts to (1) ground our- selves in our own culture; (2) constantly recover, reconstruct, .and bring forth from our culture the best of what it means to be African and human in the fullest sense; (3) speak this special cultural truth to the world and (4) use our culture to constantly make our own unique contribution to the reconception and reconstruction of this country, and to the forward flow of human history.

#### The question isn’t how do we “relate” or personal convictions about the “value” of antitrust but comparing external consequences of strategies– subject formation around tetratic thought ensures atomization.

Chandler 9. David. Prof of international relations, University of Westminster. “Questioning Global Political Activism,” in What is Radical Politics Today? ed. Jonathan Pugh. 81-4.

Today more and more people are ‘doing politics’ in their academic work. This is the reason for the boom in International Relations (IR) study and the attraction of other social sciences to the global sphere. I would argue that the attraction of IR for many people has not been IR theory but the desire to practise global ethics. The boom in the IR discipline has coincided with a rejection of Realist theoretical frameworks of power and interests and the sovereignty/anarchy problematic. However, I would argue that this rejection has not been a product of theoretical engagement with Realism but an ethical act of rejection of Realism's ontological focus.

It seems that our ideas and our theories say much more about us than the world we live in. Normative theorists and Constructivists tend to support the global ethical turn arguing that we should not be as concerned with 'what is' as with the potential for the emergence of a global ethical community. Constructivists, in particular, focus upon the ethical language which political elites espouse rather than the practices of power. But the most dangerous trends in the discipline today are those frameworks which have taken up Critical Theory and argue that focusing on the world as it exists is conservative problem-solving while the task for critical theorists is to focus on emancipatory alternative forms of living or of thinking about the world. Critical thought then becomes a process of wishful thinking rather than one of engagement, with its advocates arguing that we need to focus on clarifying our own [END PAGE 81] ethical frameworks and biases and positionality, before thinking about or teaching on world affairs. This becomes 'me-search' rather than research. We have moved a long way from Hedley Bull's (1995) perspective that, for academic research to be truly radical, we had to put our values to the side to follow where the question or inquiry might lead.

The inward-looking and narcissistic trends in academia, where we are more concerned with our reflectivity- the awareness of our own ethics and values - than with engaging with the world, was brought home to me when I asked my IR students which theoretical frameworks they agreed with most. They mostly replied Critical Theory and Constructivism. This is despite the fact that the students thought that states operated on the basis of power and self-interest in a world of anarchy. Their theoretical preferences were based more on what their choices said about them as ethical individuals, than about how theory might be used to understand and engage with the world.

Conclusion

I have attempted to argue that there is a lot at stake in the radical understanding of engagement in global politics. Politics has become a religious activity, an activity which is no longer socially mediated; it is less and less an activity based on social engagement and the testing of ideas in public debate or in the academy. Doing politics today, whether in radical activism, government policy-making or in academia, seems to bring people into a one-to-one relationship with global issues in the same way religious people have a one-to-one relationship with their God.

Politics is increasingly like religion because when we look for meaning we find it inside ourselves rather than in the external consequences of our 'political' acts. What matters is the conviction or the act in itself: its connection to the global sphere is one that we increasingly tend to provide idealistically. Another way of expressing this limited sense of our subjectivity is in the popularity of globalisation theory - the idea that instrumentality is no longer possible today because the world is such a complex and interconnected place and therefore there is no way of knowing the consequences of our actions. The more we engage in the new politics where there is an unmediated relationship between us as individuals and global issues, the less we engage instrumentally with the outside world, and the less we engage with our peers and colleagues at the level of political or intellectual debate and organisation. [END PAGE 82]

You may be thinking that I have gone some way to describing or identifying what the problems might be but I have not mentioned anything about a solution. I won't dodge the issue. One thing that is clear is that the solution is not purely an intellectual or academic one; the demand for global ethics is generated by our social reality and social experiences. Marx spent some time considering a similar crisis of political subjectivity in 1840s Germany and in his writings - The German Ideology, Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Theses on Feuerbach, and elsewhere - he raged against the idealism of contemporary thought and argued that the criticism of religion needed to be replaced by the criticism of politics - by political activism and social change based on the emerging proletariat (see Marx, 1975, for example). Nearly two centuries later it is more difficult to see an emerging political subject which can fulfil the task of 'changing the world' rather than merely 'reinterpreting it' through philosophy.

I have two suggestions. Firstly, that there is a pressing need for an intellectual struggle against the idealism of global ethics. The point needs to be emphasised that our freedom to engage in politics, to choose our identities and political campaigns, as well as governments' freedom to choose their ethical campaigns and wars of choice, reflects a lack of socialties and social engagement. There is no global political struggle between 'Empire' and its 'Radical Discontents'; the Foucauldian temptation to see power and resistance everywhere is a product of wishful or lazy thinking dominated by the social categories of the past. The stakes are not in the global stratosphere but much closer to home. Politics appears to have gone global because there is a breakdown of genuine community and the construction of fantasy communities and fantasy connections in global space. Unless we bring politics back down to earth from heaven, our critical, social and intellectual lives will continue to be diminished ones.

Secondly, on the basis that the political freedom of our social atomisation leads us into increasingly idealised approaches to the world we live in, we should take more seriously Hedley Bull's (1995) injunction to pursue the question, or in Alain Badiou's (2004: 237-8) words subordinate ourselves to the 'discipline of the real'. Subordination to the world outside us is a powerful factor that can bind those interested in critical research, whereas the turn away from the world and the focus on our personal values can ultimately only be divisive. To facilitate external engagement and external judgement, I suggest we experiment with ways to build up social bonds with our peers that can limit our freedoms and develop our sense of responsibility and accountability to others. We may have to construct these social connections artificially but their [END PAGE 83] value and instrumentality will have to be proven through our ability to engage with, understand, critique and ultimately overcome the practices and subjectivities of our time.

#### Understanding the intricacies of politics, the state, and the military is a prerequisite to addressing oppression

Bryant 12 – (9/15, Levi, professor of Philosophy at Collin College and Chair of the Critical Philosophy program at the New Centre for Research and Practice, “War Machines and Military Logistics: Some Cards on the Table,” https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/war-machines-and-military-logistics-some-cards-on-the-table/)

We need answers to these questions to intervene effectively. We can call them questions of “military logistics”. We are, after all, constructing war machines to combat these intolerable conditions. Military logistics asks two questions: first, it asks what things the opposing force, the opposing war machine captured by the state apparatus, relies on in order to deploy its war machine: supply lines, communications networks, people willing to fight, propaganda or ideology, people believing in the cause, etc. Military logistics maps all of these things. Second, military logistics asks how to best deploy its own resources in fighting that state war machine. In what way should we deploy our war machine to defeat war machines like racism, sexism, capitalism, neoliberalism, etc? What are the things upon which these state based war machines are based, what are the privileged nodes within these state based war machines that allows them to function? These nodes are the things upon which we want our nomadic war machines to intervene. If we are to be effective in producing change we better know what the supply lines are so that we might make them our target.

What I’ve heard in these discussions is a complete indifference to military logistics. It’s as if people like to wave their hands and say “this is horrible and unjust!” and believe that hand waving is a politically efficacious act. Yeah, you’re right, it is horrible but saying so doesn’t go very far and changing it. It’s also as if people are horrified when anyone discusses anything besides how horribly unjust everything is. Confronted with an analysis why the social functions in the horrible way, the next response is to say “you’re justifying that system and saying it’s a-okay!” This misses the point that the entire point is to map the “supply lines” of the opposing war machine so you can strategically intervene in them to destroy them and create alternative forms of life. You see, we already took for granted your analysis of how horrible things are. You’re preaching to the choir. We wanted to get to work determining how to change that and believed for that we needed good maps of the opposing state based war machine so we can decide how to intervene.

We then look at your actual practices and see that your sole strategy seems to be ideological critique or debunking. Your idea seems to be that if you just prove that other people’s beliefs are incoherent, they’ll change and things will be different. But we’ve noticed a couple things about your strategy: 1) there have been a number of bang-on critiques of state based war machines, without things changing too much, and 2) we’ve noticed that we might even persuade others that labor under these ideologies that their position is incoherent, yet they still adhere to it as if the grounds of their ideology didn’t matter much. This leads us to suspect that there are other causal factors that undergird these social assemblages and cause them to endure is they do. We thought to ourselves, there are two reasons that an ideological critique can be successful and still fail to produce change: a) the problem can be one of “distribution”. The critique is right but fails to reach the people who need to hear it and even if they did receive the message they couldn’t receive it because it’s expressed in the foreign language of “academese” which they’ve never been substantially exposed to (academics seem to enjoy only speaking to other academics even as they say their aim is to change the world). Or b) there are other causal factors involved in why social worlds take the form they do that are not of the discursive, propositional, or semiotic order. My view is that it is a combination of both.

I don’t deny that ideology is one component of why societies take the form they do and why people tolerate intolerable conditions. I merely deny that this is the only causal factor. I don’t reject your political aims, but merely wonder how to get there. Meanwhile, you ~~guys~~ behave like a war machine that believes it’s sufficient to drop pamphlets out of an airplane debunking the ideological reasons that persuade the opposing force’s soldiers to fight this war on behalf of the state apparatus, forgetting supply lines, that there are other soldiers behind them with guns to their back, that they have obligations to their fellows, that they have families to feed or debt to pay off, etc. When I point out these other things it’s not to reject your political aims, but to say that perhaps these are also good things to intervene in if we wish to change the world. In other words, I’m objecting to your tendency to use a hammer to solve all problems and to see all things as a nail (discursive problems), ignoring the role that material nonhuman entities play in the form that social assemblages take.

This is the basic idea behind what I’ve called “terraism”. Terraism has three components: 1) “Cartography” or the mapping of assemblages to understand why they take the form they take and why they endure. This includes the mapping of both semiotic and material components of social assemblages. 2) “Deconstruction” Deconstruction is a practice. It includes both traditional modes of discursive deconstruction (Derridean deconstruction, post-structuralist feminist critique, Foucaultian genealogy, Cultural Marxist critique, etc), but also far more literal deconstruction in the sense of intervening in material or thingly orders upon which social assemblages are reliant. It is not simply beliefs, signs, and ideologies that cause oppressive social orders to endure or persist, but also material arrangements upon which people depend to live as they do. Part of changing a social order thus necessarily involves intervening in those material networks to undermine their ability to maintain their relations or feedback mechanisms that allow them to perpetuate certain dependencies for people. Finally, 3) there is “Terraformation”. Terraformation is the hardest thing of all, as it requires the activist to be something more than a critic, something more than someone who simply denounces how bad things are, someone more than someone who simply sneers, producing instead other material and semiotic arrangements rendering new forms of life and social relation possible. Terraformation consists in building alternative forms of life. None of this, however, is possible without good mapping of the terrain so as to know what to deconstruct and what resources are available for building new worlds. Sure, I care about ontology for political reasons because I believe this world sucks and is profoundly unjust. But rather than waving my hands and cursing because of how unjust and horrible it is so as to feel superior to all those about me who don’t agree, rather than playing the part of the beautiful soul who refuses to get his hands dirty, I think we need good maps so we can blow up the right bridges, power lines, and communications networks, and so we can engage in effective terraformation.

#### Neurological, racial bias is flexible and determined by coalitional habit forming in the brain---orienting groups around institutional change best breaks down bias. This is offense because their theory rejects these solutions.

Cikara and Van Bavel 15. (Mina Cikara is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Intergroup Neuroscience Lab at Harvard University. Her research examines the conditions under which groups and individuals are denied social value, agency, and empathy. Jay Van Bavel is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Social Perception and Evaluation Laboratory at New York University. The Flexibility of Racial Bias: Research suggests that racism is not hard wired, offering hope on one of America’s enduring problems. June 2, 2015. <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-flexibility-of-racial-bias/>)

The city of Baltimore was rocked by protests and riots over the death of Freddie Gray, a 25-year-old African American man who died in police custody. Tragically, Gray’s death was only one of a recent in a series of racially-charged, often violent, incidents. On April 4th, Walter Scott was fatally shot by a police officer after fleeing from a routine traffic stop. On March 8th, Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity members were caught on camera gleefully chanting, “There Will Never Be A N\*\*\*\*\* In SAE.” On March 1st, a homeless Black man was shot in broad daylight by a Los Angeles police officer. And these are not isolated incidents, of course. **Institutional and systemic racism reinforce discrimination in countless situations, including hiring, sentencing, housing, and even mortgage lending**. It would be easy **to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in America’s social fabric and** even, perhaps, **an** inevitable aspect of human nature. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our awareness. **Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress**. Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by exposing people to images of faces while scanning their brains in fMRI machines. **Early studies found that when people viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias**. This work has led many to conclude that racial biases might be part of a primitive—and possibly hard-wired—neural fear response to racial out-groups. **There is little question that** categories such as **race**, gender, and age **play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to bear in their judgments of others**. However, **research has shown that how people categorize** themselves **may be just as fundamental to understanding prejudice as how they categorize others**. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are formed on arbitrary grounds, such as the simple flip of a coin. These **findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form coalitions**. Recent research confirms **that** coalition**-based** preferences trump race**-based** preferences. For example, **both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political** party **much** more than **they favor those who share** their race. These **coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics**. Our **research has shown that the simple act of placing people on a** mixed-race team **can** diminish **their** automatic racial bias. In a series of experiments, **White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias**. **Merely belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations with all of the members of their own group, irrespective of race**. **Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups produced similar effects on brain activity—the** amygdala responded **to** team **membership** rather than race. Taken together, **these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves**. Although these coalition-based distinctions might be the most basic building block of bias, they say little about the other factors that cause group conflict. Why do some groups get ignored while others get attacked? Whenever we encounter a new person or group we are motivated to answer two questions as quickly as possible: “is this person a friend or foe?” and “are they capable of enacting their intentions toward me?” In other words, once we have determined that someone is a member of an out-group, we need to determine what kind? The nature of the relations between groups—are we cooperative, competitive, or neither?—and their relative status—do you have access to resources?—largely determine the course of intergroup interactions. Groups that are seen as competitive with one’s interests, and capable of enacting their nasty intentions, are much more likely to be targets of hostility than more benevolent (e.g., elderly) or powerless (e.g., homeless) groups. This is one reason why sports rivalries have such psychological potency. For instance, fans of the Boston Red Sox are more likely to feel pleasure, and exhibit reward-related neural responses, at the misfortunes of the archrival New York Yankees than other baseball teams (and vice versa)—especially in the midst of a tight playoff race. (How much fans take pleasure in the misfortunes of their rivals is also linked to how likely they would be to harm fans from the other team.) **Just as a particular person’s group membership can be flexible, so too are the relations between groups. Groups that have previously had cordial relations may become rivals (and vice versa)**. Indeed, psychological and biological responses **to out-group members** can change, depending on whether or not that out-group is perceived as threatening. For example, people exhibit greater pleasure—they smile—in response to the misfortunes of stereotypically competitive groups (e.g., investment bankers); however, this malicious pleasure is reduced when you provide participants with counter-stereotypic information (e.g., “investment bankers are working with small companies to help them weather the economic downturn). Competition between “us” and “them” can even distort our judgments of distance, making threatening out-groups seem much closer than they really are. These distorted perceptions can serve to amplify intergroup discrimination: the more different and distant “they” are, the easier it is to disrespect and harm them. Thus, not **all out-groups are treated the same: some elicit indifference whereas others become targets of antipathy. Stereotypically threatening groups are especially likely to be targeted with violence, but those** stereotypes can be tempered **with** other info**rmation.** **If perceptions of intergroup relations can be changed, individuals may overcome hostility toward perceived foes and become more responsive to one another’s grievances.** **The** flexible nature **of both group membership and intergroup relations offers reason to be** cautiously optimistic **about the potential for greater cooperation among groups in conflict** (be they black versus white or citizens versus police). One strategy is to bring multiple groups together around a common goal. For example, during the fiercely contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary process, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama supporters gave more money to strangers who supported the same primary candidate (compared to the rival candidate). Two months later, after the Democratic National Convention, the supporters of both candidates coalesced around the party nominee—Barack Obama—and this bias disappeared. In fact, merely **creating a sense of** cohesion **between two competitive groups can increase empathy for the suffering of our rivals**. **These** sorts of **strategies** can help **reduce aggression toward hostile out-groups, which is** critical for creating more opportunities for constructive dialogue addressing greater social injustices. Of course, instilling a sense of common identity and cooperation is extremely difficult in entrenched intergroup conflicts, but when it happens, the benefits are obvious. Consider how the community leaders in New York City and Ferguson responded differently to protests against police brutality—in NYC political leaders expressed grief and concern over police brutality and moved quickly to make policy changes in policing, whereas the leaders and police in Ferguson responded with high-tech military vehicles and riot gear. In the first case, multiple groups came together with a common goal—to increase the safety of everyone in the community; in the latter case, the actions of the police likely reinforced the “us” and “them” distinctions. Tragically, these types of conflicts continue to roil the country. Understanding the psychology and neuroscience of social identity and intergroup relations cannot undo the effects of systemic racism and discriminatory practices; however, it can offer insights into the psychological processes responsible for escalating the tension between, for example, civilians and police officers. **Even in cases where it isn’t possible to create a common identity among groups in conflict, it may be possible to blur the boundaries between groups**. In one recent experiment, we sorted participants into groups—red versus blue team—competing for a cash prize. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to see a picture of a segregated social network of all the players, in which red dots clustered together, blue dots clustered together, and the two clusters were separated by white space. The other half of the participants saw an integrated social network in which the red and blue dots were mixed together in one large cluster. Participants who thought the two teams were interconnected with one another reported greater empathy for the out-group players compared to those who had seen the segregated network. Thus, reminding people that individuals could be connected to one another despite being from different groups may be another way to build trust and understanding among them. A mere month before Freddie Gray died in police custody, President Obama addressed the nation on the 50th anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Selma: “We do a disservice to the cause of justice by intimating that bias and discrimination are immutable, or that racial division is inherent to America. To deny…progress – our progress – would be to rob us of our own agency; our responsibility to do what we can to make America better." The president was saying that **we**, as a society, **have a responsibility to reduce prejudice and discrimination**. These recent findings from psychology and neuroscience indicate that we, as individuals, possess this capacity. Of course this capacity is not sufficient to usher in racial equality or peace. Even when the level of prejudice against particular out-groups decreases, it does not imply that the level of institutional discrimination against these or other groups will necessarily improve. **Ultimately, only** collective action **and** institutional evolution **can address systemic racism**. **The science is clear on one thing, though:** individual bias and discrimination are changeable**.** **Race-based prejudice and discrimination, in particular, are** created and reinforced by **many** social factors, **but they are** not inevitable consequences of **our** biology**.** Perhaps understanding how coalitional thinking impacts intergroup relations will make it easier for us to affect real social change going forward.

#### You cannot “escape” pre-existing modes of relationality---attempts to do so re-create neoliberalism.

Love 15 – Associate Professor at the University of Pennsylvania [Heather, ““Doing Being Deviant: Deviance Studies, Description, and the Queer Ordinary,” *differences* Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 89-91]

Today, queer studies – prestigious but unevenly institutionalized – still signals absolute refusal or criticality – all anti- and no normativity. In their influential 2004 essay, “The University and the Undercommons” (and in the 2013 book that followed from it), Fred Moten and Stefano Harney rely on such an understanding of queer (as well as concepts borrowed from black studies, feminism, ethnic studies, and anticolonial thought). They call for betrayal, refusal, theft, and marronage as modes of resisting the iron grip of the academy, pointing to an uncharted, underground, and collective space they call the undercommons. “To enter this space,” they write, “is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons” (103). Moten and Harney speculate whether the “thought of the outside” (105) is possible inside the university and suggest that if there is an outside, it is along the margins and at the bottom. Yet their imagination of that outside is indebted to the inside, in particular to the conception of deviance produced within sociology. Their account of the undercommons reads like a rap sheet, a list of the traditional topics of deviance studies: theft, homosexuality, prostitution, incarceration.

Moten and Harney do not describe the undercommons, but rather ask their readers to join it, to participate in active revolt against profes- sional and disciplinary protocols. To o er an objective account of the social position of radical academics would be to further business as usual in the academy; dwelling in the undercommons requires giving up on the usual protocols of description. Moten and Harney argue against the traditional role of the “critical academic” (105), which they see as just another turn of the professional screw, since work that opposes the academy does not challenge its basic structure or everyday operations. They argue that “to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and to be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of the internal outside, that unassimilated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions” (105). In contrast to the figure of the critical academic, they forward the image of the “subversive intellectual” who is “in but not of” the academy (101). Without dismissing the galvanizing effect of such a call to the undercommons, it is important to consider the limits of the refusal of objectification as a strategy. To be unlocatable, to be nowhere, to be in permanent revolt: Moten and Harney describe the path that queer inquiry laid out for itself. Objectification – recognition, description, critique – can be a way to reinforce the status quo, but it is also a way of acknowledging one’s institutional position and the real differences between inside and outside. Even the most subversive intellectuals in the academy are “on the stroll” in a metaphorical but not a material sense. The fate of those who came “under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love” (101), if they survive, is to become “superordinates” in Becker’s sense.

Whose side are we on? Can we hold onto the critical and polemical energy of queer studies as well as its radical experiments in style and thought while acknowledging our implication in systems of power, management, and control? Will a more explicit avowal of disciplinary affiliations and methods snuff out the utopian energies of a field that sees itself as a radical outsider in the university? To date, both the political and the methodological antinormativity of queer studies have made it difficult to address our implication in the violence of knowledge production, pedagogy, and social inequality. Such violence is inevitable, and critical histories of the disciplines – and the production of knowledge about social deviance – are essential. Undertaking such work, however, will not allow escape into a radically different relation to our objects because we are (as Moten and Harney also argue) part of that history – we are its contemporary instantiation. To imagine a social world in which those relations are transformed – in what Moten and Harney refer to as the “prophetic organization” (102) – may be crucial for the achievement of social justice, but to deny our own implication in existing structures is also a form of violence.

#### Transhumanism fails

**Clarke 11** (CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ISCAST Online Journal 2011 Vol. 7 Doppelganger planet: Astrobiology and contrasting Christian and transhumanist eschatologies Jonathan Clarke is a Geologist and Mars researcher who lives and works in Canberra. He is a Director and Fellow of ISCAST, and worships at St. Matthews Anglican Church, Wanniassa, ACT. An earlier version of this article appeared in The Melbourne Anglican, February 2011, page 22. http://www.iscast.org/journal/opinion/doppelganger\_planet\_\_cposat\_jon\_clarke.pdf)

Finding life elsewhere in our solar system, especially if proved to have an independent beginning, would have major implications for finding it elsewhere in the universe. If life occurs independently on two (or more) bodies in our solar system, or even once did, then life is almost certainly commonplace on the universe. If not then it may not be so common, though not necessarily rare. Finding of life elsewhere in the universe raises the so-called Fermi paradox. If life is common, the paradox goes, if intelligence is the inevitable product of life, and technology the inevitable consequence of intelligence, then where is everybody? Surely in a 13 billion year old universe of a hundred billion or more galaxies, each with a hundred billion starts, some species must have developed means of travelling or signalling across interstellar distances. But they haven’t done so as far as we know, despite decades of efforts by scientists involved in SETI. This so-called ‘great silence’ has many explanations. Perhaps life is actually rare. Perhaps intelligence or technology are not inevitable. Perhaps there are limits to technology that prevents travel, communication, or even showing signs of presence across interstellar distances. Some postulate a ‘great filter’, or several, that greatly reduce the likelihood of a species emerging onto the interstellar stage. Life may require much more specialised conditions than we know of, be more subject to natural catastrophes than we realise; or perhaps **technological societies nearly all self destruct after all. This is bad news for transhumanist philosophers** whose hope for the future is a vision splendid of biological engineering, fusion of the biological and the machine, and uploading of human consciousness. Such speculations have led the trans-humanist philosopher Nick Bostrum of Oxford to write: I’m hoping that our space probes will discover dead rocks and lifeless sands on Mars, on Jupiter’s moon Europa, and everywhere else our astronomers look. It would keep alive the hope for a great future for humanity. The more common life, especially advanced life, is in the universe, the greater the likelihood that the great filter lies in the future. Alternatively, as suggested by Graham Phillips, while planets are common in the universe (this year has seen the discovery of the 500th extra-solar planet), maybe it is civilizations which are rare. The universe is certainly full of planets, life may be common, but perhaps it is the business of civilisation that is hard to start. Perhaps we can pin our hopes on this.

#### The aff’s transhumanism reinforces white hegemony

Hlulani M. Mdingi, 21. Department of Systematic and Historical Theology, Faculty of Theology and Religion, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa. "The irrevocable pedagogical value of the Bible: Liberation transcends technology." HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 77, no. 1 (2021): 1-9.

To avoid a sense of evasiveness in the theological and digital debate, the role of race cannot be ignored as it applies to preaching, missionary work, translation and interpretation. Ali (2017:1) noted that posthumanism is a recognition of the image of the white man. He (Ali 2017:2) further asserted that techno-scientific post-human has asymmetric power relations between the human (white) and the subaltern other, and transhumanism is a techno-scientific articulation of whiteness. Cave and Dihal (2020:686) asserted: ‘Race and technology are two of the most powerful and important categories for understanding the world as it has developed since at least the early modern period’. Ali (2019:209) also argued that a ‘White crisis’ is a modern racial phenomenon with premodern religious beliefs and has proposed that Apocalyptic AI is an existential risk and strategy for maintaining white hegemony. Ali points are critical in order to avoid thinking about technology and the digital space as nuanced and objective developments. Ali (2019:210) brings our attention to note that race relates to the formation of the world system and goes as far back into the Middle ages with the proto-racism found in the ancient Greeks. Ali (2019:216) also noted that Apocalyptic AI as salvation is rhetorical and presents a narrative shaped by ‘white saviour’. Thus, technology and digitisation of the Bible at least through the liberationist paradigm cannot deter the existential quest for justice and liberation as an irrevocable condition of the Bible. Technology is not paradise but ambience of possible fortune or peril; blacks must remain on guard.

#### Technology doesn’t allow anyone to overcome oppressive power structures

Hlulani M. Mdingi, 21. Department of Systematic and Historical Theology, Faculty of Theology and Religion, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa. "The irrevocable pedagogical value of the Bible: Liberation transcends technology." HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 77, no. 1 (2021): 1-9.

The Bible and digital space: Theological concerns After laying the historical background to the reception and role of the Bible in Africa and the epistemological turns in the reading of Bible, this section focuses on the Bible and the digital space. Harker (2015:52) noted that the word of God has become digital and screens have become ubiquitous, and the western culture is technopoly. He, also stresses the need for scrutiny of the implication of technology for the church and Bible. Harker (2015:53) further argued that technology makes humans unlimited, challenges traditional beliefs and changes cultures for better or worse. In light of the black experience and Harker’s position of the western society as technopoly, the latter is possible if the Bible in the digital space causes euphoria that negates history and the liberative and confrontational instruction of the Bible in the world, a call towards justice. Harker (2015:53–54) dispelled the onesided aspect of technology by pointing to the fact that technology will also compete for our attention, time, money, and worship. Whereas, the Bible is able to reshape us even in a device and reminds us of our limitation as it decentres selfinterest. Harker (2015:54) has discussed what he calls the device paradigm, which means a saturated life with devices that mediate our everyday experience, thus, revealing that technology is not neutral because it orientates and shapes behaviours and manners. The device paradigm technology dictates our perception of reality. This point is critical especially with millennials that often find comfort in devices and show no interest towards the history of dehumanisation that runs parallel with technological development (Biko 1978). Technology changes the way we think, what we care about with regards to morals; the Bible thus becomes another device and in this paradigm the Bible may cease being a living text (see Harker 2015:54–55). However, Hutchings (2014:25) noted that the Bible as an App has led users to have regular biblical engagements because of the easy access to the Bible; the technological development of the Bible as an App or in a digital device is driven by Christian agency of Scripture. Hutchings (2017:206) noted that the digital Bible can remain Evangelical and digitisation of the Bible is a historical process, for example, from scroll, letter, codex illuminated manuscript and the printed book. Another, aspect inseparable to the digitisation of the Bible is the meaningfulness of the Bible message to the believers (Hutchings 2017:207). Hutchings (2017:212, 215) noted that the digital Bible is a persuasive technology and represents a fluidity of the text.

#### Black liberation theology can’t overcome western biases

Hlulani M. Mdingi, 20. Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa. "The black church as the timeless witness to change and paradigm shifts posed by the Fourth Industrial Revolution." HTS Theological Studies 76, no. 2 (2020): 1-9.

The current technological and scientific developments of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) signal great leaps in human intellect and creativity. At the crossroad of great steps into the future, a future that will be determined by science and innovation, the smeared bond between theology and science recoils upon theological consideration of human intellect. Black liberation theology has stressed a change in paradigm, which takes oppression, class and intellect seriously. This research seeks to elaborate that a general acceptance of human intellect and science tends to ignore that modern-day science is part of Western civilisation. The Western world view remains dominant in the world. It will be argued that while the 4IR is important, the intellect, politics, economics and need for a 4IR, however, remain synonymous with the need of the West to 'civilise' the world. Institutions such as the World Economic Forum are Western institutions and still represent the goals of Western civilisation. This article argues that great leaps in science must be measured by the Christian church's commitment to eschatology and a building of an egalitarian society on earth. The article seeks to explore if the notion of a black church can be instrumental in the 4IR for focusing on the human condition and humanity of the oppressed in Africa and Latin America. The article argues that the church's role is to witness great change in society and it must be prepared to actively respond to great societal change posed by the 4IR.

## 2NC

### T USFG---2NC

#### It uses state in the context of particular agencies---obviously not an assemblage.

Maurrasse, 96 - David Jeffrey Maurrasse, Adjunct Research Scholar, The Earth Institute at the Columbia Climate School, Columbia University; 1996(“Revolutionary enough: Black power and state repression New York, United States of America and Kingston, Jamaica, 1964—1976,” Doctorate Dissertation presented to Northwestern University (accepted), pp. 42-43, Available to Subscribing Institutions via Proquest Dissertations Library, bam)

U.S. Agencies and the Status Quo

Since the U.S. state apparatus plays such a significant role in both case studies of this work, its various agencies deserve particular attention. Given its decentralized government structure, is the United States of America a "nation-state" with a particular role with respect to the status quo? The United States of America represents a powerful and reactionary state, which maintains a significant degree of economic and military power and seeks to preserve a global status quo from which it benefits. Within its boundaries, the U.S. nation-state operates to maintain an internal status quo which is partly characterized by racism and class-based hierarchy facilitated by capitalism.

Decentralization within the U.S. state apparatus is evident in the very name, "United States." However, in the case of the Black Panther Party, state (in the U.S. sense), city, and federal aspects of the United States government cooperated in repressing the BPP. In the case of Jamaica, although it was the CIA (as only one state agency) that infiltrated the country, even those aspects of the U.S. apparatus which could reprimand the CIA failed to do so. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), for example, was formed to examine the activities of U.S. intelligence agencies. The HPSCI investigated an alleged CIA plot to assassinate Jamaican President, Michael Manley. However, the CIA only had to deny the charges, and the case was dropped (Johnson 1989,220).

The U.S., as a nation-state with a particular role, is decentralized into several state agencies which sometimes severely conflict. When it came to radical protest, movements, or potentially progressive states during my period of focus, conflicts between state agencies were often tactical disagreements rather than philosophical ones. As history demonstrates, the FBI and CIA often fought over the right to repress certain populations.

When examining state repression, it is critical to draw links, if they exist, between local and national state agencies. On the local level, urban areas became the central settings for repression at the hands of the police. Critical to this study is the manner in which special police forces cooperated with the United States Federal Government (Donner 1990).

#### Their evidence agrees.

Butler, 21 – Philip Butler, Assistant Professor of Theology and Black Posthuman and Artificial Intelligence Systems at the Iliff School of Theology; 2021(“A Black Tetratic Future: Blackness and the Age of Hyper-Exponentiation (Hyper-4),” in *Critical Black Futures: Speculative Theories and Explorations*, ed. Philip Butler, Palgrave Macmillan, EBook, pp. 44-47, bam)

Still, not every system will be as thoroughly constructed/imagined as the next one. We could think of these limitations as holes in one’s epistemology. These holes would allude to the virtuality of epistemic systems in the era of tetration (DeLeuze 1997). In theory, these holes would provide views into a less virtual, more stable reality. The stability of this reality would be less dependent on being accepted by the viewer. To that extent, it would exist beyond the virtual epistemology (viewed as real). But there are a couple of issues here. First, this more stable/less virtual environment could not be some all-encompassing universal reality. It would merely be the virtuality/reality that is foundational to the present reality of the viewer/perceiver. Her holes would allude to the existence of a more solidly grounded version of the perceiver’s current epistemic structure. In this next layer are less holes, and, hopefully, more cohesion of thought. Similarly, this next layer (which, conceptually, is more stable than the previous) would be an incomplete construction as well. This then leads to an infinitely recursive process of exploring, undoing, and constructing one’s epistemological formation in order to find a more thorough and cohesive approach to thought—the primary currency in the tetratic era. Secondly, no matter which system is subscribed to (in a hyper-4 era) there is always something that exists beyond/behind the epistemology that makes a hyper-4 reality possible. This is different that burrowing further into any one framework. It has more to do with the interconnections inherent to the hyper-4 existence that do not allow for any one thing to stand alone as itself. All is interwoven. All is entangled. Similar to how quantum entanglement is understood in physics as shared proximal space, inseparability, interdependence and interconnection. Entanglement, in this sense, is the positional awareness of the ways one is inextricably interconnected with everything. However, one’s configuration of said entanglement is indicative of one’s epistemology, embodiment, and perceived reality. Each functions as a separate factor that must constantly be reimagined. Configuring reality is akin to “decod[ing] the matrix” (Hussle 2018). And, while it can be said that Galileo (1564–1642), Shirley Jackson (1946–), and Philip Emeagwali (1954–) each existed on earth, there were different technological and scientific manifestations associated with each figure. Some might suggest that earth was not the same in the span between thinkers (due to changes in atmosphere, extinction of species, technological advances, etc.), but if there were major differences it might be attributed to data. Now, decolonial thinkers would assert that data accrual is not necessarily a good thing given the means utilized to gather data (Mignolo 2006). We could even say that cultivation of data further takes people into realities that support the value attributed to data. Still, I wonder about the data, or information, that has been unearthed through asking questions. This has been the case whether through some empirical escapade or through the decolonial practice of undoing, delinking, and redoing (Mignolo 2011). This speaks to the relationship that questioning has to systematic or tetratic thought. Questioning becomes the device/tool of reverse engineering epistemologies/realities that allow for stronger thought/technology/reality to emerge. In addition, the strength of each reality rests on their ability to exist with the least amount of holes. This speaks to the three-pronged correlation thought has to technology and reality. Strong systems of thought lead to stronger technology, which ultimately lead to stronger realities. These strong realities are the most “advanced.” Here advanced suggests detailed, clarified, and mapped. Holes speak squarely to an epistemology’s virtual quality. This is to suggest that tetration era epistemologies that have the strongest systematic orientation will have the longest life span. It is not to say that systems which encompass the most answers always win out. Systems thinking accounts for entanglement. It does not deny it, or work to exist without it in an unmitigated fashion. More answers may seem like more stability. But depth of clarity amidst entanglement helps create fluid systems. Depth is understood as being the result of critical exploration. Length of response is not. This could be argued given that holes in one’s epistemology represent weakness in one’s epistemology. Lengthy unsubstantiated ideas/concepts are also considered holes/weaknesses. Weaknesses in any epistemology speak to the limitations of that epistemology. Good epistemologies acknowledge their weakness/limitations (Popper 2014). They do not try to exist as infallible. Even more so, limitations are also indicators of spaces/concepts/trajectories that are inadequately unaccounted for in a particular epistemological formation. Which could simply mean that there is room for further exploration— hence the movement to the less virtual reality/epistemology. But the measure to determine what might qualify as adequate accountability (determination of virtuality) is a matter of value and context as well. Regardless, systematic thinking, inclusive of critical questioning, is tetratic thinking. Subsequently, tetratic thinking, as systematic thinking, is the key to manipulating/harnessing tetration/hyper-4 technology.

### Cap K---2NC

#### 4 – Cap turns communities of tetratic thought – reduces new imaginations into a commodity thru alienation – the 1AC will have a voice but lose its soul as it’s reincorporated as a new item on the market

Robinson 14 – Professor of sociology at UC Santa Barbara [William, *Global capitalism and the crisis of humanity*, Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. 222-4]

How viable are transformative strategies based on the notion that local communities can withdraw from global capitalism? The attempt to create alter- native communities at the local level, to set up cooperatives, to decentralize circuits of food supply, to withdraw from the global agro-industrial regime, to decentralize energy distribution and consumption, and to construct cooperative enterprises and local solidarity economies are necessary and important. Yet they do not in themselves resolve the problem of power. In the absence of a strategy to confront the state and to transform the system from within we are left with the dangerous illusion that the world can be changed without resolving this matter of power. Global capitalism is now internal to practically all communities on the planet. It has spun webs of worldwide interdependency that link us all to a larger totality. Global capitalism is indeed totalizing. The notion that one can escape from global capitalism not by defeating it but by creating alternative spaces or islands of utopia ignores the unpleasant fact that no matter how one wills it to be so, these spaces cannot disengage from capitalism, if for no other reason than that capital and the state will penetrate – often forcibly – and continuously reincorporate these spaces.

Localized solutions are too piecemeal to confront the power of global capitalism – to change the global balance of class and social forces. There is no way to get around the fact that the TCC holds class power over humanity, and the TNS exercises multiple forms of direct, coercive power. The state exercises power over us. This fact will not go away by ignoring this power. It is illusory to suppose that it can be countered by constructing autonomous communities, which in fact are not autonomous because such communities cannot extricate themselves from the webs of global capitalism, and even if they could, in theory, the state would not allow them to; it would use the force of its law to reincorporate such communities. There is no getting around confrontation with the state, no avoiding a struggle to wrest state power away from capital, its agents and allies. The struggle to withdraw from global capitalism, no matter how important, must be coupled with a struggle to overthrow global capitalism, to destroy the transnational capitalist state.

#### 3 – Local to Global Bad – tetratic thought is explicitly not global – the question of this debate is which model translates collectives to overcome commoditization of dissent – the perm that scales up from “local” to “global” gets the direction of causality wrong by mystifying how world economies structure local relations – misdiagnosis turns solvency.

Engel-Di Mauro 9 – Associate Professor of Geography at SUNY New Paltz (Salvatore, “Seeing the local in the global: Political ecologies, world-systems, and the question of scale”, Geoforum (2009):116-125)

Despite the emphasis on multiple scales of analysis, ‘‘webs of relation” (Rocheleau and Roth, 2007), ‘‘chains of explanation” (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987, p. 27), ‘‘bottom-up” (Blaikie, 1985, p. 82), or ‘‘progressive contextualisation” (Vayda, 1983), most of the work in political ecology privileges spatio-temporally limited social contexts over longer-term, macro-scale social processes (Bridge, 2002, p. 371). While this may be the outcome of a recent distancing from political economy perspectives (Brown and Purcell, 2005, p. 611), the problem was inherent from the very beginning, with a tendency to emphasise the ‘‘regional” or meso-scale (and then ‘‘local”, or micro-scale) as the starting unit of analysis. This analytical centring of smaller-scale dynamics has resulted in an inability to integrate general patterns and interconnections with ethnographic and eco- systemic data (Blaikie, 1999, p. 140; Brown and Purcell, 2005, p. 612). This is far from saying that micro- or meso-specificity is less important than macro-specificity (the two are equally important in my view). Micro- and meso-level analysis is pivotal in under- standing people–environment relations, especially given that the most tangible occur largely over small areas. Yet emphasis on the smaller scale becomes a hindrance when it guides, rather than builds the empirical foundations of a research project. With few exceptions, political ecology continues to suffer from a methodological insis- tence on explaining people–environment relations through the analysis of smaller-scale circumstances and/or starting points. Planet-wide environmental and, since at least 500 years ago, social processes enable and/or constrain smaller-scale people–environment relations, especially with recent human-induced shifts in atmosphere composition (radiative forcing through greenhouse gas emissions, stratospheric ozone layer disruption through the emissions of bromines and chlorofluorocarbons, regional releases of atmospheric pollutants through burning vegetation and coal com- bustion, etc.). The scale of analysis adopted in a research project may depend on the kind of question one wishes to answer (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987, p. 65), but ultimately larger-scale processes must be included to arrive at explanations that go beyond appeals to complexity (Blaikie, 1985) or beyond eclecticism in the frameworks being combined (Blaikie, 1999, p. 139). The matter is exacerbated when phenomena in some parts of the whole are confused for evidence that negates either the existence of the entire system (or of any systemic process at all) or denies the possibility of a general theory on resource management (e.g., Black, 1990; Forsyth, 2003). There are other epistemological repercussions from such small locality-specific analyses and small-to-large scale approaches. One is treating places (or regions) as isolatable (often implicitly, by not paying attention to wider systemic processes), which enabled political ecology to circumscribe the range of social and environmental contexts to those far away from most political ecologists’ homes (McCarthy, 2002; Robbins, 2004). The underlying problem was reflected in the exclusion of places outside rural ‘‘third” world areas from the purview of political ecology (countries in the former state-socialist camp are still mostly ignored).2 Recent attention to wealthy industrialised capitalist societies and urban ecosystems is a helpful first step in moving political ecology away from a relatively narrow focus3 and into more promising cross-comparative terrain that can generate more systematic analy- sis (see works guest edited by Heynen and Robbins, 2005; Paulson and Gezon, 2005; Schroeder et al., 2006).

#### 1 – we are not in a new era of tetration – the primary driver for the data economy is the material base – only the alt that forefronts cap solves

Srnicek 17 – Lecturer at City University London and a PhD from the London School of Economics [Nick, *Platform Capitalism*, Polity Press, pp. 37-9]

Numerous theorists have argued that these changes mean we live in a cognitive, or informational, or immaterial, or knowledge economy. But what does this mean? Here we can find a number of interconnected but distinct claims. In [END OF PAGE 37] Italian autonomism, this would be a claim about the ‘general intellect’, where collective cooperation and knowledge become a source of value.3 Such an argument also entails that the labor process is increasingly immaterial, oriented towards the use and manipulation of symbols and affects. Likewise, the traditional industrial working class is increasingly replaced by knowledge workers or the ‘cognitariat’. Simultaneously, the generalised deindustrialisation of the high-income economies means that the product of work becomes immaterial: cultural content, knowledge, affects, and services. This includes media content like YouTube and blogs, as well as broader contributions in the form of creating websites, participating in online forums, and producing software.4 A related claim is that material commodities contain an increasing amount of knowledge, which is embodied in them. The production process of even the most basic agricultural commodities, for instance, is reliant upon a vast array of scientific and technical knowledges. On the other side of the class relation, some argue that the economy today is dominated by a new class, which does not own the means of production but rather has ownership over information.5 There is some truth in this, but [END OF PAGE 38] the argument goes awry when it situates this class outside of capitalism. Given the imperatives of capitalism hold for these companies as much as for any other, the companies remain capitalist. Yet there is something new here, and it is worth trying to discern exactly what it is.

A key argument of this chapter is that in the twenty-first century advanced capitalism came to be centred upon extracting and using a particular kind of raw material: data. But it is important to be clear about what data are. In the first place, we will distinguish data (information that something happened) from knowledge (information about why something happened). Data may involve knowledge, but this is not a necessary condition. Data also entail recording, and therefore a material medium of some kind. As a recorded entity, any datum requires sensors to capture it and massive storage systems to maintain it. Data are not immaterial, as any glance at the energy consumption of data centres will quickly prove (and the internet as a whole is responsible for about 9.2 per cent of the world’s electricity consumption).6 We should also be wary of thinking that data collection and analysis are frictionless or automated processes. Most data must be cleaned and [END OF PAGE 39] organised into standardised formats in order to be usable. Likewise, generating the proper algorithms can involve the manual entry of learning sets into a system. Altogether, this means that the collection of data today is dependent on a vast infrastructure to sense, record, and analyse.7 What is recorded? Simply put, we should consider data to be the raw material that must be extracted, and the activities of users to be the natural source of this raw material.8 Just like oil, data are a material to be extracted, refined, and used in a variety of ways. The more data one has, the more uses one can make of them.

#### 2 – Posthumanism link – it fails to destroy the human, reifies capital thru localism, denial of species being, and post-historical immaterialism – locks in eco crisis

Cotter et al. 16 – Jennifer Cotter, English at William Jewell; Kimberly Defazio, English at Wisconsin-La Crosse; Robert Faivre, English at SUNY; Amrohini Sahay, English at Hofstra; Julie P. Torrant, English at Kingsborough Community College; Stephen Tumino, English at CUNY; Rob Wilki, English at Wisconsin-La Crosse [“Introduction: Posthumanism and the Evacuation of Critique,” in Cotter, K. DeFazio, R. Faivre, A. Sahay, J. Torrant, S. Tumino, &, R. Wilkie eds. *All Too (Post)Human: The Humanities after Humanism*, Lanham: Lexington Books, pp. 1-9]

Most theorists today treat posthumanism and the posthumanities-"decentering the human in favor of a tum toward the nonhuman, understood variously in terms of animals, affectivity, bodies, organic and geophysical systems, materiality, or technology" 1 -as the tum to encompass all turns. This is because in the dominant posthumanities the abandonment of the "human-centeredness" that sets boundaries between the human and the nonhuman is said to open the potential for creating a truly democratic planetary multiplicity without a center that exceeds all limits, whether ontological or epistemological. Against the "speciesism" of the "Anthropocene," posthumanism proposes life as becoming-in-common what Jacques Derrida frames as "l'animot," 2 Donna Haraway calls "transspecies encounter value," 3 Bernard Stiegler names "technogenesis," 4 Manuel DeLanda writes as "flat ontology," 5 Bruno Latour describes as "practical metaphysics," 6 Timothy Morton announces as "geophilosophy," 7 and Rosi Braidotti, "a monistic ontology." 8 Posthumanism, in other words, functions as the spiritual sign of a community-to-come that moves beyond all social binaries and "unites not through con-vergence, con-version, or con-fusion, but rather through di-vergence, di-version, and dif-fusion." 9 The "community to come" is, in all its multiple mediations and philosophico-tropic idioms, an ecotheosophy of the dissolving of the fundamental binary of class which underpins capitalism.

Human, All Too (Post)Human: The Humanities after Humanism is an intervention into the posthumanism tum. We argue that posthumanism does not represent the death knell of humanism that announces the advent of the nonhuman common, as it is widely represented, but instead is [END OF PAGE 1] humanism's latent side: the difference of humanism with itself as it adjusts to the heightening class contradictions in the shift from analog to digital capitalism. Humanism and posthumanism, in other words, are cultural representations of property relations that normalize wage labor, the main obstacle to social transformation. To go beyond humanism and the dominant posthumanities, we argue, requires a critique of the "spiritual aroma" 10 of both and the role they play in naturalizing the world as it is, as the way it will always be.

Following Nietzsche, the arche-theorist of posthumanism, the contemporary posthumanities treats itself as the voice of a post-speciesist ethics, cut free from a humanist modernity that linguistically divides the human from the animal and creates hatred for that which, in tum, becomes "animal." 11 Humanism's valorization of the human as the moral, conscious subject of free will that is the bearer of a universal essence, and its referential theory of language, according to which language, as interrelated signs, correspond to the empirical reality outside it, are seen by posthumanism as incapable of addressing the relation of human and nonhuman life and the emerging social realities. More specifically, the posthumanities views humanism's centering of the human and its theory of language as imposing arbitrary constructs and divisions and that, as a result, maintain the artificial boundaries between the human and the nonhuman (e.g., animals, nature, technology, objects) in contemporary life. Severing humans and language from their material relations, posthumanism ultimately creates a cultural imaginary in which human subjects are placed beyond conventional cultural and epistemological boundaries and divisions. Which is another way of saying that posthumanism spiritualizes the material relations produced by class.

Posthumanism, for instance, rejects humanism's worshiping of the industrious and self-determined ("free") individual, but disconnects these ideas from the relations of wage labor that are the material basis of humanism. By treating humanism as a way of thinking that needs to be negated by new thinking, posthumanism simply substitutes a new ethics of commonality among human and nonhuman life without addressing the material relations that, in the class interests of a few humans, systematically put all other human and nonhuman life at risk. In replacing the "selfish" ("free") human with a cooperative transspecies, it does not address the social relations within which the selfish and the cooperative develop and acquire their (class) value. Humanist modernity, in other words, is not merely an artificial regime constraining the vitality of "life." It is a relay of the social relations of industrial (" analog") capitalism, which required referential modes of thinking conducive to "mass production" and the Fordist mode of accumulation of surplus value and which fostered a more unified notion of subjectivity to suture class contradictions. The globally integrated social relations of digital (postindustrial) capitalism, which exploit labor through increasingly more complicated, high-tech forces of production, depends on updated notions of subjectivity, language, and understanding. That is, it requires subjects with a planetary consciousness of plurality and more complex theories of language for which there is never any single reliable referent but an irreducible multiplicity of referents. Through this framework, today's increasingly crisis-ridden empirical reality appears as in excess of all rational thought and language and thus as beyond class analytics and class struggle.

Relations between the human and the nonhuman, the natural and the technological, and the environmental and the social, are, to put what we have said differently, fundamentally shaped by the material relations of society, which under all stages of capitalism remain rooted in the appropriation of surplus value in the working day. But, whereas the dominant posthumanities treats historical conditions more in terms of "entanglement" and the "enmeshed" networks in which the boundaries between humans, animals, objects, and technology fade in and out of reality, we argue that such concepts actually erase the material structures of human and nonhuman life. They offer modes of cultural resistance to the growing alienation of daily life and appeal to the growing need to connect diverse events in global capitalism, but they disappear the exploitative relations between people that actually shape and explain humans' relation with technology and nonhuman life. It is not "technology" in itself that has harmed the environment and "decentered" existence, but technology as it is produced under for-profit social-i.e., class-relations of production that has deepened the environmental crisis and exacerbated the class struggle across all boundaries. Posthumanism naturalizes wage labor by depicting issues of climate change, environmental collapse, and economic crisis in apocalyptic terms: as aleatory, unrepresentable, and exceeding explanation. This fascination with apocalyptic thinking in the posthumanities is, more often than not, a means of displacing the social relations of production which shape what events become "disasters" and why. In contrast, what is necessary today, we argue, is the end of alienation and estrangement in the "negation of the negation" that is socialism, the "actual phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and rehabilitation." 12

This book thus offers a different reading of the posthumanism tum by implicating the posthumanities in the dialectics of capital and labor. The posthumanism tum's aggressive politics of affirmation, which equates affirmation with "life itself" and reduces critique to a "thanatopolitics" that fetishizes the negative and thus the negation of life, 13 has become a powerful paradigm for denying the negation of capitalism represented by the critique of its "root" in exploited and alienated labor. Posthumanism' s moral rejection of the "arrogance" of humanism and its claim to an awareness of the devastating techniques of humanist "intentionality," not only for humanity but especially for the nonhuman environment in [END OF PAGE 3] which both are inextricably "entangled," is an eco-ethics "without a subject" that reinscribes the spiritual agency traditionally ascribed to humans in Western theology to a transcendent idea of "materiality without materialism and even perhaps without matter." 14 It affirms the nonhuman as "wholly other" 15 to all that exists, materially and ideally, as the excess of the conceptual. What is thus proposed as a radical departure from the instrumental reason and humanist binaries of the Enlightenment that oppose the "world in itself" (res extensa) to the "world for us" (res cogitans) is the "world as occulted." 16 The consequence of such arguments is perhaps most clearly articulated by Eugene Thacker when he says about the occulted world that, "regardless of how much knowledge we produce about it, [it] always retains some remainder" 17 that cannot be explained by the social, and thus, cannot ground the emancipatory project of "finding a new or improved version of the world-for-us." 18 In the dominant posthumanities this spiritual common-ism (like Kant's sensus communis) represents the immanent secret of the world believed to exist above and beyond the social division of labor which militates against critique of the existing world so as to change it.

The dominant posthumanism, we argue, takes as its starting point the alienation of social life under capitalism which results from private property and, under the empty sign of an ethical awareness of all being, turns this alienation into the "natural" condition of all existence. Whereas posthumanism begins with the premise that, as Nietzsche puts it, "We are from the very beginning illogical and thus unjust beings" for whom a world without inequality is an arrogant fantasy, 19 we argue, following Marx, that humans are social beings: they are a product of their collective labor in all forms-both manual and intellectual-that enables them to transform both themselves and their conditions of existence. The advances of industry, science, culture, and technology are the expressions of the social life of humanity as it develops the ability to consciously and collectively transform nature and, in the process, transform itself as "[humanity] is a part of nature." 20 The history of humanity-the relations between humans, nature, and things-is therefore the history of humans' modes of production. In this sense, capitalism is an expression of the social life of humanity, but it is an expression of social life divided against itself that through the mechanism of exploitation turns the "life activity" of humanity into "a mere means to [its] existence." 21 Under capitalism, a system that takes the collective labor of humanity and directs it toward the generation of wealth for the few, the means by which humanity exists as a species becomes the means by which each individual is forced to survive in an economic competition that divides people from each other and from nature. Through private ownership of the means of production, capitalism strips from the majority of humanity everything needed to live except their labor-power, and thus turns the "species life" of humanity in the collectivity of labor into the "natural life" of class society and the alienation of individual wage-labor. The species-being of humanity, the "free, conscious activity" of collective labor, 22 is denied by capital's ideologists in order to propagate the idea that there are only individuals as they exist within class society: no collectivity of labor and therefore no alternative to the existing.

Insofar as the concept of the "natural" remains suspect in the annals of contemporary cultural theory, the reduction of class life to natural life takes the form today of a postnatural, postsocial and, above all, posthistorical ontology in which class relations disappear and (bourgeois) individuality is (again) reborn as the difference constitutive of posthuman "common being." In the words of Roberto Esposito, common being "is the interval of difference, the spacing that brings us into relation with others in a common non-belonging, in this loss of what is proper that never adds up to a common 'good."' 23 Truly enlightened, in this narrative, are those today who recognize humans' fundamental ontological state of "non-belonging." The implication here is that the historical and material contradictions of social life that prevent realizing a just society are not the problem. It is instead humans' reliance on ("totalizing") notions ( e.g., "common good"), since these suppress the difference of the (non)human by falsely assuming human ideas can ever represent, much less understand, the world. More specifically, according to the arguments for the need for a "posthumanism" tum, the various social and cultural failures of capitalism, whether in regards to meeting people's needs or protecting the environment, are not a consequence of production for profit, but the "correlationism" at the heart of Western philosophy; namely, "the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from one another." 24 In this Nietzschean narrative, the imposition of "human knowledge" on being results in the erasure of individual- ity, uniqueness, and difference, as well as the failure to recognize the nonhuman agents that shape and reshape reality on their own terms indifferent to human interests.

Posthumanism displaces the praxis of critique-the explanatory critique of world-historical material relations of exploitation that are bringing about contemporary crises and new struggles toward the collective transformation of these relations-on the grounds that critique requires the "humanist" presumption of "knowing" and thus reproduces the "correlationism" that "habitually [grasps] the world in terms of our own preimposed concepts." 25 Instead, the dominant posthumanism contends that what we are witnessing is not simply an environmental or social crisis which can be resolved through human intervention, but an epistemological failure to realize the extent to which the world and all manner of nonhuman actants operate alongside of and independently of human intentionality or understanding. 26 As Thacker argues, "we cannot help but to think of the world as a human world, by virtue of the fact that it is [END OF PAGE 5] we human beings that think it" but "one of the greatest challenges that philosophy faces today lies in comprehending the world in which we live as both a human and non-human world." 27 As a result, at a time when human intentionality is said to be the cause of so many "large" (and selfinflicted) crises-" planetary disasters, emerging pandemics, tectonic shifts, strange weather, oil-drenched seascapes, and the furtive, always looming threat of extinction" 28 -the world as conceived of by humans as "for us" is therefore "increasingly unthinkable" 29 and all forms of "human-centric" thought, including the praxis of critique, are declared to be "inadequate" in the era of "global climate change." 30 What is needed instead, according to posthumanists, is an ethical tum to a conception of the "world-in-itself-for-us"; that is, the world as a "hidden" realm that is "indifferent to human knowledge, much less to our all-too-human wants and desires." 31 The posthumanism tum thus predicates the collective project of securing the social good on "acknowledging" the "nonhuman ( ... ]as a being in its own right;" 32 that present in "all beings whatsoever: eraser, black hole singularity, ceramic knife, molasses, slug" is an "infinite feeling of inner space" that makes them the "spiritual" equals to humans. 33

Because posthumanism has become the dominant cultural logic and its terms and assumptions now shape the daily common sense, our critique may be dismissed as repressive of the "real" -ity of posthumanism and elan vital. Critique as a social praxis is made out to be an "outdated" practice in the time of posthumanism because of what is said to be its "speciesist" assumption that life can be grasped and transformed through the movement of "reason." However, critique is not the movement of pure reason as it is represented in humanist discourses, nor is it the figure of undecidability immanent in textuality that undoes the metaphysics of humanism, as it is in the post-humanist philosophy that traces itself through the writings of Heidegger, Derrida, and deMan. Both these understandings of critique assume that critique is without material foundation and has no basis in reality. The basis of critique, however, is, as Marx says, "man himself," 34 man, that is, not as "an abstract being squatting outside the world," but men "as they actually are; i.e. as they act, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will." 35 In other words, the critique of humanism is not a rejection of all that makes man appear "other than himself," as Marx puts it in his early writings, but a situating of the human within what Marx calls "species being." 36 This entails getting at the root of what constitutes our being-in-common while paying close attention to the ways in which human productions negate themselves and estrange the producers from their collectivity and nature. To be clear: Marx is the original thinker of the "(post)human" in terms of thinking the human not as an ahistorical essence but in terms of "the ensemble of the social relations." 37 In Marx's writings, however, the material conditions through which human beings produce themselves are not reified as an occult "other" realm, but instead grasped historically as an ongoing process of the transformation of the natural-social world by collective labor. The (post)humanism in Marxist thought, in other words, is not the merely speculative "posthumanism" of the contemporary but the materialism of the social relations which historically produce the human (differently) as human. Marxist (post)humanism, in other words, is a materialist inquiry into the class conditions of the estrangement of species-being in production for profit so as to transform capitalism. It is just such inquiry that is blocked by the dominant posthumanist assumption that rejects any "figure which makes man into a species" 38 on the grounds that to do so reduces politics to the biopolitics of "state philosophy," what Derrida calls the regime of "carnophallogocentrism," with its "interventionist violence that is practiced [ ... ] in the service of or for the protection of the animal, but most often the human animal." 39 Rather, posthumanist theory purports to define "the nature of reality independently of thought and of humanity more generally," 40 and, by avoiding the projection of "an epistemological problem into the ontological realm," to prevent "the basic determination of 'what is111 from being "a contentious political matter." 41 Indeed it is just this erasure of species- being as the ontological horizon of the human - both its foundation and, in class societies, its negated "essence" -which explains why posthumanism now has become the dominant mode of intelligibility that naturalizes and justifies the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production and, especially, the ruthless binary of class.

Posthumanism, we argue, borrows a move of the old Young Hegelians by taking the historical relativity and incompleteness of human knowledge about the world as the decentering of thought within itself and assumes that the self-alienation of thought is a sign of the existence of a spiritual common of nonhuman others that humanity must learn to live with for the good of all. "Ontology" becomes the sign of a self- destructing kernel that exposes the limits of human epistemologies and calls our attention to the inherent unknowability of being itself. Robert Pepperell thus argues that the "technological advances[ ... ] in the fields of micro-electronics, gene manipulation, and communications" that "point to the possibility of controlling, synthesising or even surpassing aspects of nature which until now have eluded our command," 42 have ironically revealed that "our capacity to order and control the universe is ultimately limited," 43 thus ushering us into a posthuman condition in which "we no longer find it necessary, or possible, to distinguish be- tween humans and nature." 44 On this view, the incompleteness of our scientific control over nature is taken to mark an absolute categorical limit that militates against the capacity of humans to produce positive and reliable knowledge of the nonhuman world such as is required to wrest a "realm of freedom" from the "realm of necessity." 45 By taking the [END OF PAGE 7] historical relativity of knowledge and making it into an absolute principle about the "unknowable" nature of reality, posthumanism asserts that because the material world that exists outside our heads is not always or absolutely conceptually grasped there is something "wholly other" about it such that it can be neither known nor transformed. Ontology, in this context, comes to represent the "hidden" nonlocalizable materiality that cannot become an object "for us," like Kant's notion of the "noumenal" realm that exists "in itself" independently of the "phenomenal." The radical alterity of this "other" world does not prevent posthumanism from finding there, however, "enmeshed" networks of human and nonhuman "assemblages" that, they insist, announce a cognitive break from Enlightenment anthropocentrism: the arrival of a planetary consciousness for which binary relations are outmoded mental impositions on the world, not the effect of material social structures. The posthumanism turn thus turns theory into a local, speculative, and contingent meditation with no knowable connections to the contemporary "crises," ecological and otherwise, that are said to be the central concern of the posthumanities, and thereby makes the world safe for capital by immunizing it from critique. The ideological effects of posthumanism' s accomodationism are, in this context, not avoided by the emerging theoretical movement known as "accelerationism," which instead of rejecting humanist reason and techne, claims to "side with the emancipatory dynamic [ of capitalism] that broke the chains of feudalism" by embracing technology and ostensibly seeks to accelerate the end of the property relations that fetter technological and scientific advance. 46 While the accelerationists have been depicted as "transhumanist" in their "Promethean" embrace of technology and human progress, 47 they in fact update posthumanism' s occulting of class in a more radical guise. Responding to the immanent failures of posthumanist atomizing of the social and dismantling of any possibility of social transformation, they call for "organizing a broadly populist left, building the organizational ecosystem necessary for a full-spectrum politics on multiple fronts, and leveraging key points of power whenever possible." 48 They nonetheless continue the North Atlantic left's dismissal of class exploitation as the basis of capitalism. Proposing that a twenty-first century post-capitalist movement has to revise Marxism's class critique beyond recognition on the grounds that "this analysis failed to attend to both the range of possible liberating struggles (based in gender, race, or sexuality) and the ability of capitalism to restructure itself," 49 the accelerationists' call for a post-work society that "remains irreducible" to class interests 50 simply, and one-sidedly, inverts other posthumanists' denunciation of technology and promotes "cryptocurrencies" and "social networks" as the starting points for a new public sphere. Like other iterations of posthumanism, accelerationism occults the class basis of the social as "community."

Human, All Too (Post)Human is a red critique of the posthumanism tum which, as in Marx's inversion of Hegel, "turns it right side up again" by seeking the causes of capitalism's crises not in the "general consciousness" but in "the real community." 51 Posthumanism, we argue, dematerializes both humanism and posthumanism. It represents the class relations of capitalist society and their proliferating consequences on human and nonhuman life as an effect of how we think. We argue, instead, that how we think about the human is shaped by the labor relations that in complex and sometimes highly mediated ways shape all aspects of social and cultural, human and nonhuman life. Humanism is not primarily a self-centered worldview; it is a ruling-class ideology. It reflects a historical arrangement of human relations, one in which the social priority is not meeting common needs but the private accumulation of wealth. These class relations have shaped the way humans and nature are treated: not as ends in themselves, but as means for expanding the accumulation of profit. Posthumanism, however, removes class relations from the landscape of humanism and posthumanism and thereby underwrites the authority of capital over the social. Each of the texts included in this collection is, instead, guided by the praxis of critique, which begins by regrounding "general consciousness [as] only the theoretical shape of that of which the living shape is the real community" 52 in order to "show the world what it is really fighting for," as such "consciousness is something that it has to acquire, even if it does not want to." 53 In contrast to the posthumanist imaginary, Human, All Too (Post)Human advances the critique that what is presented as an ethical tum toward the nonhuman is an extension of rather than an opposition to the idealism and humancenteredness of humanism; in fact, it radicalizes the reformism of earlier humanist projects for change by essentially declaring the extinction of the great collective struggles for social emancipation, and naturalizing humanity under capitalism as humanity as such. Through an analysis of the diverse discourses of the posthumanism turn - from "animal studies" and "common-ism" to "object-oriented-ontology," "biopolitics," and "accelerationism" -we demonstrate why the logic of posthumanism is a ruling class ideology that in the name of "entanglements" dis-entangles the effects of capitalism from the cause of contemporary crises in capitalist production and presents the image of a world beyond understanding or transformation. We argue that it is only the negation of capitalism and its private ownership of the means of production-namely, the full realization of the collectivity of labor that is communism-that represents the "genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man -the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species." 54